
IN THE BEGINNING GOD CREATED HEAV
AND THE WORD WAS MADE FLESH AND DWELT AMONG US
REALITY
FALL, 1955

REALITY

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cum permissu superiorum

God, the Highest Truth, has created and guides human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones but rather that having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth.

Pius XII

Encyclical Humani Generis.

EMMANUEL SUAREZ
Nov. 5, 1895–June 30, 1954
Eightieth Master General
of the
Order of Preachers


A Melvin Phillips

WE DEDICATE

The General Chapter of the Friars Preachers met at Rome in September of 1946 and on a very early ballot Father Emmanuel Suarez was chosen Master General of the Order. Tears welled up in his eyes as he realized the full implication of the electors' choice. He was to be the eightieth successor of Saint Dominic. Perhaps his thoughts wandered for an instant to a moment of history enacted many centuries ago when a young Spanish priest knelt on the cold stone floor of the cathedral of Osma and implored heaven with prayers and tears to relieve a similar feeling of inadequateness. Whatever may have been his thoughts at the time, in more than his humility Father Suarez reflected the spirit of the holy founder. It is never a single virtue which will define his whole personality. Other eulogists have portrayed a figure of unwavering judgment, simplicity, unassuming affability, and true apostolic spirit. Father Suarez was the man of God, "powerful in word and work, suited in every way to preach Christ's gospel." His youthful freshness, serenity, and gentleness perfectly mirrored Saint Dominic; but it is the progress of the present and the hope of the future which will determine the impact which Father Suarez had on Dominican life in the twentieth century.

Emmanuel Suarez y Fernandez was born at Herías, a small village in the Spanish province of Asturias, on November 5, 1895. Answering an early call to the Dominican life he enrolled in the Apostolic School at Corias where he received the habit of the Order on August 28, 1913. After a year novitiate at Ira Floria (Padrón-Coruña) he professed his vows of religion and returned to Corias for philosophical studies. These early years of study were interrupted only once by illness which forced him to return to his native village in northern Spain for a brief period of convalescence. A close friend of his youth spoke of the enormous capacity for silence, reserve, intellectual precision, and prudence which characterized the student days of Father Suarez. At the venerable convent of Saint Stephen in Salamanca, he completed his theological training and received the degree of lectorate in Sacred Theology. On December 18, 1920 he was ordained to the sacred priesthood.

Superiors were aware of his exceptional talent and Father Suarez was sent to Rome to specialize in law. At the Pontifical Athenaeum "Angelicum" he was awarded the doctorate in canon law to which he added a doctorate in Roman law from the Institute "Apollinare."

For two years Father Suarez taught history of philosophy and moral philosophy at Corias in his native Spain, but he was recalled to Rome and the chair of canon law at the Angelicum. For nine years Father Suarez was dean of the law faculty. After reviewing canon law in terms of dogmatic and moral theology he merited the highest honor of the Dominican Order, the degree of Master of Sacred Theology.

In Spain during the Civil War Father Suarez suffered the torments of hundreds of his countrymen. During one six month period he was forced to the seclusion of a small room where he remained until his escape from the country. At Rome he recovered his broken health only to return once more to spend the rest of the war years in Spain. All his energy was concentrated on helping his fellow priests flee the country.

But Rome was to be the center of his life. Although his Spanish brothers elected him to be their provincial in 1938, higher authorities would not sacrifice his talents even for this high administrative post in the most flourishing province of the Order.

During the war years he became Rector Magnificus of the Angelicum in 1941, and a year later prior of the convent there. On September 21, 1946 he was elected Master General of the Order of Friars Preachers.

Alphrido Cardinal Ottaviani, Pro-Secretary of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, in a letter to the Dominicans shortly after Father Suarez's death, spoke of the "extraordinary and tireless activity with which he carried out many delicate missions for the good of the Order and of the Church." Most noteworthy are the positions he held in the Roman Curia: consultor of the Congregations of the Council, of the Sacraments, and of the Oriental Church; member of the Commission for Matrimonial Causes, and of the Commission of Vigilance in the Ecclesiatical Tribunals of the Congregation of the Sacraments; member of the Commission for the Constitution of Secular Institutes in the Sacred Congregation of Religious; consultor of the Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of Canon Law; lawyer for the Sacred Roman Rota; prosynodal judge in the Tribunal of the Vicariate of Rome.

The esteem of his country merited the "Grand Cross of the Order of Isabel the Catholic," and membership on the Higher Council of Scientific Investigation.

The Order of Saint Dominic found new life during the eight years of his office as Master. We are particularly grateful for his fatherly guidance during those years, but it is difficult to overlook the worldwide influence of Father Suarez. Three new provinces were established in

Australia, Brazil, and Switzerland; the province of Chile was restored; vicariates were erected in Japan, Venezuela, and Bolivia; membership in the three Branches of the Order increased by several thousand.

Saint Dominic's love of the rosary was reflected in the zeal with which Father Suarez promoted the Rosary Crusade. At Fatima he erected a new convent close to the spot where the Virgin had exclaimed, "I am the Lady of the Rosary." Innumerable manifestations of his wisdom and prudence were admirably summed up in the words of Cardinal Attaviani: "Whoever had recourse to his enlightened and profound knowledge . . . or to his long experience of men and things, received counsel and judgments of singular intuition which were a source of amazement."

We of the province of Saint Albert the Great cannot fully express our gratitude for the goodwill shown to us by Father Suarez. At his request our fathers went to Africa, to Lagos in the south, and to Sokoto in the north where a prefecture was established under the direction of the Most Reverend Thaddeus Lawton, O.P. At the petition of His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, CROSS and CROWN, a magazine of spiritual theology for the laity was begun in 1949.

The ALBERTUS MAGNUS LYCEUM FOR PHYSICAL SCIENCES and the INSTITUTE OF SPIRITUAL THEOLOGY which received the paternal blessings of Father Suarez when established a few years ago at River Forest, Illinois, are still flourishing.

A new novitiate at Winona, Minnesota, Saint Peter Martyr Priory, was erected in 1949 . . . "Vocations constitute the true blessing of God upon your work."

"You cannot have too much preparation for your work in the vineyard of the Lord." Due to the increase of vocations a new house of theology was formed in Dubuque, Iowa. By next Easter Saint Rose Priory will be ready for occupancy by two-hundred thirty Dominicans, and another of the dreams of Father Suarez for our province will be realized.

It is a year since that tragic automobile accident took the lives of Father Emmanuel Suarez and his secretary, Father Aureliano Martinez. It is much easier now to look over the past with the sadness of his sudden death somewhat allayed. Towards us, the students of Saint Albert's province, he always had a special affection. When he heard that we were publishing a journal of philosophy and theology, Father Suarez wrote the following letter of encouragement:

Roma, December 25, 1950

Convento S. Sabina (Aventino)

Dear Students,

The Very Reverend Father Provincial has had the goodness to send me the first copy of the first number of your publication, REALITY. Truly, you could not have given me a more pleasing Christmas gift!

I have believed and have always said that you were *a hope*, but now I see from your review that you are already *a reality*. The manner of presenting and of resolving the questions, the style, the soundness of judgment—all these indicate that you can build upon firm and secure foundations.

If, then, being still on school benches, you are already *a reality*, this is surely a good indication that tomorrow you will be a more potent reality.

Many things await you. The high ministry which our Order has been called to fulfill will find you so much the more prepared in all the duties which the Province, the Order, and the Church will entrust to you. In the matter of preparation, *numquam satis!* You and your professors and superiors have so understood this, that, over and above the preparation in virtuous living and in the ordinary ecclesiastical course, they have willed to direct you towards this proximate preparation for the apostolate of the pen.

Onward, my beloved students. My heart follows you. The blessings of the patriarch, Saint Dominic, accompanies you.

Paternally in Saint Dominic,

EMMANUEL SUAREZ, O.P.
Master General

We know that the best eulogy to Father Suarez will not be found on paper, but in the actual accomplishment of those goals which he proposed to his sons. With these thoughts in mind, and with the certainty that he will continue to pour out upon us the blessings of Saint Dominic, we, the student brothers of the Province of Saint Albert the Great, dedicate this issue of REALITY to the memory of a beloved father.

BEATO ANGELICO – THE CHOSEN ONE

"THE ARTIST IS OF HIMSELF A PRIVILEGED PERSON among men, but the Christian artist is, in a certain sense, a chosen one, because to those chosen to contemplate it is proper to enjoy and to express God's perfections." These encouraging words were addressed to a group of Italian artists received in audience by His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, April 8, 1952.[1] They clearly indicate the unchanging attitude of the Church concerning one of the essential characteristics of art, which consists in a certain intrinsic affinity of art with religion. This conformity in turn renders artists the interpreters of God's infinite perfections, and particularly of the beauty and harmony of His creation.

But in this task is it possible for artists to succeed in breaking through the narrow and tortuous enclosure of the finite? Immersed in a world of touch and sight and sound while living here below, can they really provide windows on the infinite for man's hungry soul? Can they crown their artistic ideals with the revitalizing and integrating ideals of religion? Yes, it is possible. The celebrated art critic, Bernhard Berenson, once had good cause to praise an artist who had succeeded in doing just this:

> Perfect certainty of purpose, utter devotion to his task, a sacramental earnestness in performing it, are what the quantity and quality of his work together proclaim.[2]

This man sought God here below in nature and in man, but above all within himself. He did not vainly try to give the human without the divine, nor nature without its Creator. He harmonized instead the finite with the infinite, the temporal with the eternal, man with God, translating into easy reading and universal language the sublime truths of Christianity. Enough of this man's works have come down to us to reveal not only his qualities as an artist, but also his character as a man. Who he was, what he aimed at, what he attained, is the subject of the following essay.

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[1] A.A.S., XLIV (1952), p. 353.

[2] Bernhard Berenson, *The Florentine Painters of the Renaissance*, (London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906), p. 23.

The world knows him as Fra Angelico, a famous 15th century Italian painter. He was born in the hills of Tuscany in 1387. History tells little of his early years. His father's name was Pietro; at baptism the boy was named Guido. They were natives of the small village of Vicchio di Mugello, about a day's journey from Florence. While still quite young Guido left home with his only brother, taking the road to Florence to learn the art of painting.

Florence, the jewelled heart of Renaissance Italy. Leading the world in throwing off the cumbersome envelopments of the Romanesque tradition in art, she nourished the genius of her sons, serving them continually, encouraging their work in all ways. Into this bright arcade of talent stepped young Guido da Vicchio. He was barely twenty years old, but even at this early age Guido showed extraordinary ability—extraordinary even for that dazzling company. Of this the famous historian Vasari reports that "he might easily have led a secular life and gained at art beyond what he possessed, for he showed great skill while still quite young."[3]

But this was not to be. In the company of his brother and another youth, Antonio Forcellioni, he met Father John Dominic, one of the most famous Dominicans of his time, who even today remains an outstanding example to all who have embraced the apostolic ministry. He was a beacon-light to his own generation, lighting the way ahead by his unquenchable zeal for souls, his untiring quest for truth, his endless labors for the Church. "He spoke of the Incarnation in such a manner," says Vasari, "as to pierce asunder soul and body, and to compel all men to follow after him."[4]

And Guido's soul was pierced. In a burst of inspired generosity the young artist offered himself to the service of God. He had decided to become a Dominican: to abandon the market-place for the cloister; to flee the turmoil of the crowded city for the quiet of an enclosed garden. Vasari writes that "being naturally quiet and modest, he entered the order of Friars Preachers chiefly for the sake of his soul and for his peace of mind."[5] This he did in 1407, receiving the habit of the Order at Fiesole, and taking the name of Fra Giovanni. Thus began a way of life that was to bring him daily closer to God.

His reception into the Order of Preachers was the signal for Fra Giovanni to advance. Within his grasp lay the powerful means of personal sanctification: the vows, a life of prayer and penance, the constant study of truth. Inseparably united to these was the compelling work of the whole Order: preaching, teaching, serving the Church in her many works, bringing souls back to the worship of the true God.

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[3] Giorgio Vasari, *The Lives of the Painters, Sculptors, and Architects*, trans. by A. B. Hinds, (London J. M. Dent, 1927), 4 Vols. Vol. I, p. 336.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 337.

The young friar's progress was swift and sure. Years of study led finally to his ordination to the priesthood. Shortly after his ordination, however, the community at Fiesole were forced to flee to Foligno. They were driven into exile by the citizens of Florence for adhering to Gregory VII, the lawful pope. The outbreak of plague in Foligno next drove the community to Cortona. When peace was restored in Florence in 1418 the brethren returned once more to Fiesole. But the stay at Fiesole was not a long one. At the request of a very great friend and benefactor, the powerful Cosimo de' Medici, the Dominicans of Fiesole accepted an invitation to establish a house in Florence. The famous architect Michelozzo Michelozzi was commissioned to rebuild the ancient convent of San Marco to house the Fiesole community. The new priory was put under the charge of Fra Giovanni's youthful friend, Antonio Forcellioni. This was Fra Antonino, he who would later become the Archbishop of Florence, and still later be numbered among the canonized saints of the Church as St. Antoninus.

History is not clear as to the precise time that Fra Giovanni was a member of the convent of San Marco. His labors in the apostolic ministry took him all over Tuscany. But most records indicate that he was in Florence from 1436 to 1443. Here at San Marco, in addition to his other duties as a preaching friar, he again turned his talents to painting.

The student of Fra Angelico's life must not think that because of his consummate abilities in the field of painting he was on this account consigned to the back cloister of the convent as an object of ridicule or community embarrassment. Nor must it be thought that his God-given skill was considered incompatible with his lofty calling. This was not the case at all; the very opposite, in fact, was true. There are very definite examples of his work during the years his community were in exile in Umbria. Among them there is an exquisite Annunciation in Cortona, and the towns of Foligno and Fiesole boast of many of his earlier works. But with his arrival in Florence the painter-preacher saw an unparalleled opportunity. At San Marco were walls, spacious and new; walls that could be made to reflect the glory of God in fresco. Here began a work that was to consume seven long years.

When the work in San Marco was finished in 1443, Fra Angelico was called to Rome by Pope Eugene IV. His fame had spread to the Eternal City. The Holy Father wished the celebrated artist to paint scenes from the life of Christ in the chapel of the Blessed Sacrament. On the death of Eugene IV, Nicholas V succeeded him. The Renaissance owes much of its early beginnings to this great patron of the arts. This cultured and studious man asked Fra Angelico to remain in Rome. And with his work in the private oratory of Nicholas V, the first serious steps were taken to decorate the walls of the Vatican Palace itself.

But students of his painting notice a marked change in the Roman work of Fra Angelico. Here he perfects his technique; but he sacrifices

simplicity for the complex. His perspective is more accurate, his figures more plastic; but the pictures themselves lack the simple ardour of his Tuscan years. Power of expression gives place to technical means. Father Aengus Buckley, himself a Dominican and a painter, calls attention to this noticeable change. He suggests that Rome, and life at the Vatican itself, were not congenial to the modest friar who loved the cloister, its simplicity and its silence.[6] He had been far more contented among his brethren at San Marco, and soon his feet are again on the road back to Florence. After a brief stop at Orvieto to complete a Last Judgment in the Cathedral there, he arrived once more in Florence in 1449.

In this same year Fra Angelico was elected prior of San Domenico di Fiesole. There are few definite facts about Fra Angelico from this period to the end of his life. His three years as prior were certainly successful ones. Vasari writes of his administration: "He was never known to indulge in anger against his brethren . . . and he never admonished but with a smile."[7] After serving as prior, Fra Angelico returned once more to Rome. In 1455, at the age of sixty-six, this holy friar entered into heaven to enjoy the glory which his paintings had so often foretold. His body was buried in Rome in the Dominican church of Sancta Maria sopra Minerva. Of this final resting place Maisie Ward suggests: "In his painting Angelico pursued tranquilly the service of truth and of wisdom, and it was fitting that he should lie in the church where the pagan goddess had given place to the Christians' Queen."[8]

The enduring work of Fra Angelico lies in the legacy of masterpieces he left to the world. Today these works are among the most prized embellishments of leading art collections throughout the world, and the churches and convents that felt the magic of his brush have themselves become famous museums. This is a living tribute to the captivating splendor of his work, and to the genuine talent that was his. But no student of his exceptional artistic works should overlook the equally fascinating personality that produced them. Fra Angelico was not just an artist; he was a man of his times—interested in God and man and nature. Above and beyond this he was a religious—dedicated to God, to the salvation of souls, to the service of goodness, beauty, and truth. And he was a Florentine.

Bernhard Berenson has called attention to the astounding significance of the Florentine painters. Forget that they were painters, they remain great sculptors. Forget that they were sculptors, and they remain architects, poets, men of science, philosophers, theologians, and even saints. Berenson realized that they left no form of expression untried, and for this reason they could never say, "This will perfectly convey my mean-

[6] Aengus Buckley, O.P., *Fra Angelico, the Master Painter*, (Dublin, Dominican Publications, 1952), p. 39.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 342.

[8] Maisie Ward, *The Splendor of the Rosary*, (New York, Sheed & Ward, 1945), p. 25.

ing." Painting offers only a partial manifestation of their personality. The artist is seen to be greater than his work; the man soars above the artist. Florentine art was pre-eminently an art formed by great personalities. Of this Berenson remarks:

> Each man of genius brought to bear upon his art a great intellect, which, never condescending merely to please, was tirelessly striving to reincarnate what it comprehended of life in forms that would fitly convey it to others; and in this endeavor each man of genius was necessarily compelled to create forms essentially his own.[9]

The world pays Fra Angelico every honor as an artist, but too often it disregards the telling fact that the artist was but one side of a truly remarkable Renaissance personality. On the other side of this beautifully minted coin was the ability to be constantly united to God, the fruit of an ardent interior life fostered in a religious community. It is important, therefore, to the appreciation and understanding of his work to realize that Fra Angelico was primarily a religious. The vigorous creations of his artistic imagination are as much a witness to his holiness as to his mastery of form and light and color. Before any consideration can be given to his artistic aims, his technique, his accomplishments, attention must be drawn to his personality which exercised such a determining influence on his artistic expression.

The work of all Christians, but especially the work of those whose lives are dedicated to God, is to strive after perfection. The goal of this lifelong task is union with God. This is achieved principally by living in the continual meditation of heavenly things. Such a life is the focal point of Fra Angelico's personality. To him can be truly applied the words: "Blessed are the clean of heart: for they shall see God."[10] The glories of heaven were constantly in his thoughts. He took to heart the invitation of St. Paul to "seek the things that are above, where Christ is seated at the right hand of God."[11]

Of his scrutiny beyond the cloak of mortal shortcomings Ruskin writes:

> Angelico, the master of all for sacred feeling, gets at it from above. His paintings are real visions of real things . . . he dreams perpetually of saints and angels, and in those dreams there come across him also little dreams of beauty . . . but there never was such exquisite ornament invented for its tenderness, purity and loveliness, as those little bits got at from above; they descend from heaven; he brings down little bits of golden pavement with him.[12]

And few there are who do not agree with him. But Angelico's "dreams" are not to be confused with those easily purchased fantasies that are the delight of indolent day-dreamers. His inspiration comes from a loving search into the secrets of God. The truths he found in meditation

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[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 2.
[10] Matt. 5:8.
[11] Colos. 3:1.
[12] John Ruskin, *Modern Painters,* (New York, Hurst & Co., 1873), 3 Vols., Vol. II Part III p. 50.

became through faith a source of loving praise. In this sense, then, it can be said that perseverance in meditation provided the material for his inspirations in painting. In this way, through prayer, Fra Angelico's works themselves were prayers. They are the result of a profound religious sense, serene and austere asceticism, nourished by solid virtue, contemplation and prayer; they are the work of one in the habit of repeating to himself, as Vasari relates, "he who makes the things of Christ ought always to be with Christ."[13]

Devotion to duty is another outstanding facet of this striking personality. When Fra Angelico left the crowded streets of Florence for the tranquil loveliness of the cloister he took Beauty with him. But it was a Beauty that demanded brush and lime and sand and color, and required so much precious time for its expression. How did he find time to execute so many flawless paintings? When was he able to sketch or plan or revise before actually beginning to work?

It is a chief character of a life lived for God that there is time in it for everything that matters. In Fra Angelico's community many hours of the day and night were spent in the praises of God. Not much time was given to food or to sleep; but there was study to be done and the work of the apostolic ministry—preaching and the administration of the sacraments. And at Florence, too, the convent was a school of religious art. The days were full; but devotion to duty was rewarded with sufficient time for something that mattered. It cannot be assumed that Fra Angelico neglected his religious duties to devote his full time to painting. This would be perverse, putting art before religion. But it can be admitted that firm adherence to the rule, prompt and faithful obedience to the work assigned him, provided Fra Angelico with the necessary time to fulfill his noble and worthy mission in the field of art.

Fra Angelico's humility is best seen in an anecdote recounted by Vasari:

> Because Fra Giovanni appeared to the Pope to be a person of most holy life, quiet and modest, as indeed he was, he wished to appoint him to the Archbishopric of Florence, then vacant. When the friar learned this he besought His Holiness to appoint another, because he did not feel himself fit to be a ruler of men, saying that his order possessed a friar who was kind to the poor, very learned, capable of ruling, and God-fearing, far better suited for that dignity than himself. The Pope recognized that he spoke no more than the truth and granted the favor freely.[14]

Thus it was that in the designs of God, through the humility of Fra Angelico, his life-time friend St. Antoninus became the Archbishop of Florence. And what a splendid example of humility. It is indeed a rare thing to decline such a dignity and so great a responsibility, when offered to one by the Pope himself, in favor of a man whom one's clear judgment and sincerity recognise as being better for it than oneself. Men of every age might well profit from the example of this holy man: asking to be

[13] *Op. cit., loc. cit.*
[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 340.

relieved of burdens which they cannot worthily sustain, and yielding them to more capable hands. Is it any wonder, then, that Fra Angelico sought God in humble prayer before attempting to speak of him in his eloquent paintings?

Closely united to this deep humility was a tranquillity of spirit and a simplicity of soul that is almost legendary. How else would he have withstood the turbulence of the times in which he lived? Only a strong interior peace could preserve his soul in the years of exile, years of active labors, of travel, of meeting the growing demands of an increasingly interested public. He was so simple and good that one day when the Pope wished him to dine with him, he excused himself from eating meat without the permission of his prior. He overlooked completely the authority of the Holy Father. Fra Angelico knew that the pursuit of art required rest, and a life of holy thoughts. For this reason the world today acclaims the pensive tranquillity of his paintings, the lucid simplicity of his figures, the glowing clarity and splendor of his heavenly colors. How fitting, then, for His Eminence, Celso Cardinal Constantini, to apply to Fra Angelico the words of Ecclesiasticus: "He shone in his days as the morning star in the midst of a cloud . . . as a flower of roses in the days of the spring . . . as frankincense burning in the fire."[15]

But if his candid piety be rightly considered an essential basis for Fra Angelico's afficacy as a painter, still another foundation is to be found in his cultural formation. The really dominant influences here are the Renaissance itself and St. Dominic's ideal of truth crystallized in the incisive language of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The Renaissance was no sudden thing. It did not steal up behind the Middle Ages to kill it with one quick blow. Like the Renaissance the mediaeval period had been full of classical discovery. These were welcomed in their time, approved by the Church, assimilated into the Christian tradition. But in art especially the Greek influence grew stronger as the Renaissance advanced; yet the calm repose and perfection of the Greek ideal was interrupted by the disturbing intensity and the greater vitality occasioned by its contact with the Gospel. In Christian art this intensity will vary with the artist: in Fra Angelico it seems most often to be an intensity of ecstasy.

The early Renaissance is a period of transition. Fra Angelico's life comes at a point central in this period. He is influenced by what Robert Longhi calls "mediaeval classicism." The influence of the classics in art and education at this time grew stronger and more widespread, but the classical does not yet threaten to overpower the mediaevel. For the early Renaissance did not so much bring a new set of ideas as a technique in handing them.

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[15] Ecclus. 50:6, 8, 9, Cf. Address of His Eminence, Celso Cardinal Constantini, delivered on the 5th centenary of the death of Fra Angelico at Campidoglio, February 19, 1955. "L'Osservatore Romano," 20 Febbraio 1955—N. 42, (28.801), p. 3.

Speaking at the opening of the exhibition of paintings of Fra Angelico at the Vatican, on April 20, 1955, His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, calls attention to this fact:

> His art is bound, it is true, to one time; it belongs to a specific era, succeeded by many, many others. But later developments are not to be considered as improving on or surpassing his art, as if it had lacked perfection or failed to attain its goal. The most modern scholars concur in this basic judgment, and have also resolved in his favor the long debated question as to whether he was a disciple of the Gothic tradition or a precursor of the humanistic renaissance. Fra Angelico was ready and prompt to assimilate the new revivifying currents of art, but he always strove to preserve for it the traditional religious character of its didactic and ethical aims. There is no doubt that he was one of the most representative links in the labor of transition from one period to the next.[16]

It is important, therefore, to stress the fact that Fra Angelico was indeed a son of the Renaissance; but in Fra Angelico artist and saint, devout Catholic and Renaissance humanist, were perfectly harmonized.

And this harmony is also seen to exist between his paintings and the truths he learned in the school of the *philosophia perennis* and to which he adhered with such tranquil certitude. How else explain his effortless success in keeping earthly delights subordinate? How else explain his ability to pierce through the appearances that conceal the deepest reality?

Thomistic doctrine is reflected not only in the content of his paintings but also in his style and technique. Like the great Doctor in his *quinque viae*, Fra Angelico takes nature as his point of departure. He loves nature passionately as the work and the reflection of God. Thus nature for Fra Angelico has a truly sacramental quality; for just as the visible action in a sacrament is a symbol of God's work in the soul, so too the visible things of nature should ever bring to mind God, their Creator.

But the visible things of nature are deceptively adroit at camouflage. They often succeed in stopping less discerning minds at the surface. Certainly the surface of things can be quite captivating and lovely, and it does possess a measure of reality; yet greater minds go deeper. And the genius of Fra Angelico went very deep. He insisted on highlighting the aesthetic aspects of nature by striving boldly to fix upon it an ideal of beauty found in contemplating a supernatural world. And his vision of creation is neither twisted nor incomplete. Like the Angelic Doctor, he identifies the beautiful with the true, the good, and with those things that are holy, perfect, chaste. He succeeds in this sacramental activity because, like St. Thomas, Fra Angelico realized that the divine perfections, of which all creation is but a reflection, are not really distinct in God, but only more or less explicitly so because of the innate weakness of the created intellect. Also contributing to this success is his knowledge of the teachings of St. Thomas concerning the great cyclic synthesis of the universe: minutely varied in its components, yet originating in perfect order

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[16] Pius XII; allocution, *Accogliendo*, (April 20, 1955). A.A.S., XLVII (1955), p. 286.

from the mind of God, and returning to Him once more after travelling an orbit that is at once harmonious, radiant, and beautiful.

All of these things contributed to the artistic formation of Fra Angelico. His art is but a reflection of his progress in the paths of Christian perfection, of his association with both Gothic and Renaissance tradition, and of his intellectual formation in the stimulating school of St. Thomas Aquinas. These elements molded his fundamental principle of art.

This basic principle was the Christ-like objective of raising earth to Heaven. Understanding this fundamental principle opens up the world of his artistic enterprise; to miss it is to number him among the Italian Primitives, greatly esteemed, to be sure, but also vague and unfathomable.

With this his guiding principle, the rest followed smoothly and naturally. His central theme was to call to mind the things of God. Whatever contributed to expressing this he used; whatever might have hindered it was sedulously avoided. This is what Berenson refers to when he speaks of his "perfect certainty of purpose." This is what Father Buckley, O.P., recalls when he says, "perhaps more than anything else it is this that gives the prayerful and candid quality to his work."[17]

This essay could not hope to make any truly analytical comment on the art of Fra Angelico. Such must be left to competent critics, whose eminence in the field of artistic criticism enable them to delve deeply into the problems of his work. But this much must be said, and the words of the present Holy Father seem to summarize it best:

> In every age he has claimed the admiring attention of scholars. Nor in fact could he have been overlooked by anyone attempting to trace the main avenues along which Western culture advanced; he is unquestionably one of the pillars of this culture, as a successful promoter of its progress and development as well as an interpreter of his own era.[18]

A well deserved tribute, abundantly and eloquently paid. It does not solve the problem of Angelico's relation to Giotto, nor the influence on him of Masaccio. It does not establish the criteria with which he resolved the new and difficult problems of space and light. Nor does it explain how he understood the return to classicism, and his rejection of the trends of neo-platonism.

But the words of Pope Pius do call to mind one singular fact regarding the technique of Fra Angelico. His importance at a period of transition has been discussed; but in the arena of style and technical execution this importance derives from his considerable progress in the field of perspective. Following the initial lead of Giotto, it was Fra Angelico who finally rescued the human form, the human face, the landscape, and the architecture of his time from the placid two-dimensional medium of the Middle

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[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 31.
[18] *Loc. cit.*

Ages. This is as significant to art as the invention of the wheel to mechanics.

But it must not be supposed that his technical and stylistic significance stopped there. There was further development, and an objective critic like Berenson is quick to remind his readers of this:

> Over the realm of feeling Fra Angelico was the first real master . . . Upon the picturing of blitheness, of ecstatic confidence in God's loving care he lavished all the resources of his art. Nor were they small. To the power of rendering tactile values, to a sense for the significant in composition . . . Fra Angelico added the charm of great facial beauty, the interest of vivid expression, the attraction of delicate color. . . . We are too apt to forget his transitional character and, ranking him with the moderns, we count against him every awkwardness of action, and every lack of articulation in his figures. Yet both in action and articulation he made great progress upon his precursors.[19]

And with his sublime purpose, his superb technique, what did this humble friar achieve? He achieved the goal of every successful preacher whose mission is to expose the truths of faith. He recounts and explains the divine mysteries of salvation, eliciting in the minds and hearts of his audience an immediate response. He draws attention to the truths of faith, by pointing out to men's minds the force of their beauty. He leads the faithful to the practice of the Christian virtues by setting before them examples that are at once attractive and beautiful.

An explicit religious or ethical function is not demanded of art as art. If it reflects the human spirit in its complete truthfulness, art continues to be sacred and religious, because it does draw attention to a work of God. But, Pope Pius XII reminds us, "if its content and aim are such as Fra Angelico gave his painting, then art rises to the dignity almost of a minister of God, reflecting a great number of perfections."[20]

Justin Murphy, O.P.

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[19] *Op. cit., p. 25.*

[20] *Op. cit., loc. cit.,* p. 292.

COMMUNICATIO IN SACRIS

"Fill up my joy by thinking alike having the same charity, with one soul and one mind."[1]

No one representing the Roman Catholic Church attended the 1954 meeting of the World Council of Churches at Evanston. Why? Many reasons were put forward to explain the seeming aloofness of the Church in this matter. The majority of these explanations missed the mark completely. The Church was accused of intolerance; the hierarchy was looked on as living in an ivory tower; the faithful were roundly condemned for flagrant violation of Society's New Commandment: Thou shalt be broad-minded in all things.

In point of fact, the reasons for the absence of Catholic representatives at Evanston are doctrinal ones. In a pastoral letter to the clergy and faithful of the Archdiocese of Chicago, His Eminence, Samuel Cardinal Stritch, stated clearly and vigorously the mind of the Church with regard to Catholic participation in such congresses as that held at Evanston:

> "Quite naturally the question arises in your minds, what should be the opinion of a Catholic, what should be his attitude with regard to these organizations and their activities? The answer of the Church to this question is: The Catholic Church does not take part in these organizations or in the assemblies or in their conferences. . . . She does not allow her children to engage in any activity . . . based on the false assumption that Roman Catholics too are still searching for the truth of Christ. For to do so would be to admit that she . . . does not preserve in herself a unity of faith, government and worship willed by Our Lord for His Church; that she does not know the true nature and meaning of that unity and of those other Godgiven properties by which she is distinguished not only as the one, but also as the holy, Catholic, and apostolic Church, founded by Jesus Christ. Such an admission she can never make, for she is now as she has always been, the one and only spouse of Christ, the one and only Mystical Body of Christ, the one and only Church of Christ."[2]

This pastoral letter is a prudent application of the Church's teaching in the matter of *communicatio in sacris*: Catholic communication in reli-

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[1] Phil. 2:2.

[2] "Pastoral Letter of His Eminence Samuel Cardinal Stritch, Archbishop of Chicago," June 29, 1954; p. 10.

gious practices with non-Catholics.[3] The aim and intention of this paper is to examine the Catholic doctrine concerning this communication. The assembly at Evanston is only one instance of the pressing need for clear, concise teaching in this matter.

It should be noted at the outset that the doctrinal exposition of this paper rests on one fundamental presupposition: *the Roman Catholic Church, and she alone, has been entrusted by God with the ways and means of sanctification and salvation. There is only one system of worship pleasing to God; the Catholic Church is the sole possessor of that system.*

The aim of this paper is a theological examination of the morality of a Catholic's communication in non-Catholic religious practices.[4] This communication is best divided in the following manner:

Public Communication { Active (or Formal) / Passive (or Material)

Private Communication { Active (or Formal) / Passive (or Material)

Explaining this division, the following should be noted:

Public communication: occurs when the non-Catholic religious exercises are organized exercises, that is, exercises engaged in by non-Catholics acting precisely as a religious group.

Private communication: occurs when the non-Catholic religious exercises are not organized exercises, but engaged in by non-Catholics acting precisely as private persons.

Active communication: occurs when the individual, in addition to being physically present in the place where non-Catholic religious practices are being conducted, actually contributes positive acts of his own to these practices.[5]

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[3] *Communcatio in sacris*, strictly speaking embraces also non-Catholic communication in Catholic religious practices.

[4] The word 'practices' as used here is intended to embrace not only religious acts of worship (as prayers, hymn singing etc.) but anything in which religious communication is possible, as places (churches, cemeteries), times (feast days or fasts), and objects (banners, images badges, robes, etc.).

[5] Active communication is sometimes distinguished into that which is formal and that which is material; by 'formal' being meant an internal and voluntary approval of the rite or sect, and by 'material' being meant a kind of disassociation of the mind from all intention of worshipping God while continuing to actively communicate. This distinction is a misleading one. It might seem to warrant the false deduction that active communication done in a material manner is permissible. Such is not the case. It will be subsequently shown that the internal approval or nonapproval does not change the intrinsic wrongness of the active communication itself. Our use of the terms formal and material is on an entirely different basis. For us formal is just another word for active and material just another word for passive. (Cf. Mahoney, Canon E. J., *Questions and Answers*, Westmonasteri; London: Burns Oates & Washbourne LTD, 1945, Vol. II, ques. 373, p. 37).

Passive communication: occurs when the individual is merely physically present, abstaining the while from any positive contributing actions.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

The problem of association with non-Catholics in their religious practices arose very early in the history of the Church. Just as early it was solved; perhaps not in its full details, but, and this is all important, in its essence.

> "They sacrifice to devils, not to God; and I would not have you become associates of devils. You cannot drink of the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils; you cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord and of the table of devils."[6]

In these strong words, St. Paul established forever the Catholic position relative to this problem. The incident which provoked Paul's mandate is familiar. His Corinthian converts were few. The great mass of their fellow townsmen were pagan, and many of these were their friends and relatives. Their case of conscience—a case which cannot ring alien to any present-day American's ears—is simply put: Can we for official reasons, or for the sake of propriety, take active part in non-Catholic religious services?[7] For First Century Corinthian neophytes these services meant communication in the sacred banquet which usually accompanied the pagan sacrifices. Paul's solution was not an involved one. He answered, no. His reason: "They sacrifice to devils, not to God, and I would not have you become associates of devils."[8] Father Prat comments on this incident:

> "Among all peoples the table forms between the guests assembled round it a sort of sacred bond, which becomes more intimate and more sacred when the banquet is the consummation of a sacrifice. For there is in a religious feast the usual union between hosts and guests; the union with the sacrificing priest, for the consumption of the victim is the complement of the sacrifice; the real or supposed union with the god, thought to be present in the midst of his worshippers; and the union with the victim itself, the vehicle of blessings. It is evident that these unions—at least, the last three—constitute a religious bond. Here, herefore, charity and edification are not at stake, but religion itself. An act of worship done in honor of a false divinity, whether one intends it or not, is an act of idolatry."[9]

Clearly, then, any contrary action on the neophyte's side in this matter is opposed to the virtue of religion which demands that our religious acts be directed to the one true God and to Him alone.[10]

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[6] I Cor. 10:20-21.

[7] That their problem was one of active communication is evident from the terminology used in St. Paul's reply. Notice, for example, such active words as: "you cannot *drink*, . . . you cannot be *partakers* . . ."

[8] I Cor. 10:20.

[9] Fernand Prat, S.J., *The Theology of St. Paul* (trans. from the Eleventh French Edition by John L. Stoddard; Westminster, The Newman Bookshop, 1952), Vol. 1, pp. 117-18.

[10] Of particular interest are Fr. Prat's words, "whether one intends it or not." Regardless of the neophytes intention (an internal act), his outward, external act would be one of idolatry, and therefore, intrinsically evil. The end (his intention) would never justify the means (his external act of idolatry) he takes to accomplish that end.

But Father Prat speaks only of the threat to religion. What about the threat to faith? Recall what Paul had already told the Romans: ". . . for with the heart, a man believes unto justice, and with the mouth, profession of faith is made unto salvation."[11] And bear in mind, too, what he was later to write to Titus: "They profess to know God, but by their works they disown him."[12] Christ Himself had warned, "everyone who acknowledges me before men, him will the Son of Man also acknowledge before the angels of God. But whoever disowns me before men will be disowned before the angels of God."[13] Apply these and other texts of similar force to the fact of active communication by Catholics in false worship. The conclusion forces itself: such communication is not only opposed to religion, it is also opposed to the virtue of faith. To profess any religious belief other than that which Christ commanded is an act contrary to His faith.

Father Prat says, ". . . charity and edification are not at stake, but religion itself."[14] What he means is that charity and edification are not *principally* at stake. To scandalize our fellow Catholics is obviously a sin against charity; and the danger of such scandal was always present. Even when it was not a question of actively participating in the pagan rites themselves, but only in eating food previously sacrificed at the rites, St. Paul warned his neophytes to beware of scandal. "But if someone says, 'This has been sacrificed to idols,' do not eat it, for the sake of him who told you and for conscience' sake—I mean the other's conscience not thine."[15] There can be no doubt that in the mind of St. Paul active communication involves the sin of scandal.

This brief examination of the teaching of St. Paul is for our purposes still incomplete. We have shown only Paul's thought concerning active communication in the religious worship of false deities. Idolatry was the point at issue here. What about the religious activities of heretics—those whose God is true, although their religious rites are not? Pope Benedict XIV[16], in outlawing religious communication with heretics, used this statement of St. Paul's to defend his position: "A factious man avoid after a first and second admonition."[17] In the Epistle to the Romans, Paul exhorted the "brethren, that you watch those who cause dissensions and scandals contrary to the doctrine that you have learned, and avoid them."[18] St. John says in his Second Epistle, "If any one comes to you, and does not bring this doctrine, do not receive him into the house, or say to him, 'welcome.' For he who says to him, 'welcome,' is a sharer in his evil works."[19]

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[11] Romans; 10:10.
[12] Titus; 1:6.
[13] Luke; 12:8-9.
[14] Prat, *loc. cit.*
[15] I Cor.; 10:28-29.
[16] De Synodo Diocesana, Lib. VI, Cap. V, n. 1, Opera Omnia, Tom. XI, p. 157.
[17] Titus; 3:10.
[18] Romans; 16:17.
[19] 2 John 5:10-11.

Commenting on these words of the Evangelist, the Holy Office applied them to the doctrine of active religious communication with heretics. By 'commenting' we mean exactly that. The Holy Office intended to present not its own doctrine, but that of St. John. Their interpretation reads in part:

> "Evidently from these words, . . . it is illicit, therefore, in sacred functions, . . . to sing psalms alternately with them (heretics) . . . and other things of external cult, which are considered rightly and deservedly as indicative of an internal bond and agreement . . ."[20]

From these few passages we can easily see that active communication in religious practices with heretics is prohibited by divine law. As regards mere association with them, however, and with unbelievers in general, for that matter, Father Prat points out that St. Paul insists that they be avoided only if they persist in propagating their error.[21]

Collating the doctrine in the passages from Sacred Scripture cited above, we can conclude to the following guiding principles:

1) Active communication in the religious practices of non-Catholics is forbidden by positive divine law. Why? Because it is contrary to the virtues of religion, faith, and charity.

2) Communication with non-Catholics, otherwise than in their religious rites, is not illicit in itself. It could become illicit, however, if by reason of circumstances the danger of scandal or perversion of the faith were present.

3) Passive communication in non-Catholic religious ceremonies is prohibited by Divine Law, only if scandal and the danger of perverting one's own faith are not removed. In itself, the mere bodily presence at these ceremonies is not made illicit by divine law.[22]

PRESENT DAY CHURCH LEGISLATION

Canon 1258 expresses the present day view of the Church on this matter.

1. It is unlawful for Catholics to assist actively in any way at or to take part in, the religious services of non-Catholics.
2. A passive or merely material presence at funerals and weddings and similar solemnities of non-Catholics may be tolerated for the sake of civil duty or honor, because of a grave reason, to be approved by the Bishop in a doubtful case, provided there is no danger of perversion or scandal present.[23]

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[20] Instr. S.C.S. Off., June 22, 1859; Coll. SCPF, Vol. I, 1176, p. 642.

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 337. Cf. also I Cor. 10:28.

[22] It might be mentioned here that active communication in non-Catholic religious practices is also contrary to the natural law. The reason for this is because the latter obliges us to do whatever we know or truly believe to be the will of God, regardless of whether these things pertain to the natural or supernatural order.

[23] For the sake of completion let us add that ecclesiastical law has never prohibited civil communication with pagans; although it has been known to legislate non-communication with Jews and heretics. St. Thomas presents the rational foundation for this in his *Summa.* St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* (English Dominicans' Trans.: New York, Benziger Bros. 1947), II^{a} II^{ae} q. 10, a. 9.

This canon is concerned with active, public communication. Canon 2316 adds to this:

> "One who spontaneously and with full knowledge helps in any way in the propagation of heresy, or who co-operated "in divinis" with heretics contrary to the provision of Canon 1258, is suspected of heresy."[24]

DOCTRINAL EXPOSITION[25]

Public Active Communication

We have previously pointed out that active or formal religious communication in non-Catholic religious practices has a multiple morality. For St. Paul, such communication was an act contrary to the virtues of religion, faith and charity.

First of all then, let us consider active communication as it is contrary to the virtue of religion. The virtue of religion disposes us to give true worship to the true God.[26] Opposed to this virtue by way of excess is the vice of superstitution.[27] St. Thomas teaches that superstitution is either giving honor to a false God or giving honor to the true God by a false cult. Both of these are intrinsically evil; the former because only the true God has a right to our worship, the latter because it contains a lie. St. Thomas explains how this happens:

> "I answer that, as Augustine states (*Cont. Mendac.* xiv), a most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to Christian religion. Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by word, so it is by deed; and it is in this signification by deed that the outward worhsip of religion consists, as shown above (Q. 81, A. 7). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship this worship will be pernicious."[28]

The Angelic Doctor then points out in the very same article that this lie can come about in two ways: either on the part of the thing signified (for example, after the inauguration of the New Law it is pernicious to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law because these forshadow the mysteries of Christ as things to come implying that these mysteries are

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[24] Heresy is defined as 'an error manifestly opposed to faith and assented to obstinately by one who had sincerely embraced the faith of Christ." It is called "error," that is, postive assent given to error, or dissent from truth. Hence, those who merely act or speak as if they do not believe, but who internally do believe, are not heretics, although in the external forum they may fall under the presumption of heresy. (Cf. John A. McHugh, O.P. and Charles J. Callan, O.P., *Moral Theology,* New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1929, Vol. I, para. 826, p. 306).

[25] One point should be clear from the outset. Every sin has two sides: The subjective one, the *knowledge-will factor,* and the objective one, *what* is actually willed and done. We are concerned here only with the objective side, with establishing the objective morality of Catholic's religious communication with non-Catholics. Whether an individual has full knowledge of what he does and whether or not he gives consent to it, is another matter altogether, and entirely outside the scope of this paper.

[26] B. Merklebach, O.P., *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (Paris: Desclee, 1947), Vol. I, para. 646, p. 682.

[27] Cf. IIa IIae, Q. 92.

[28] IIa IIae, Q. 93, A. 1, c.

not yet realized); or on the part of the worshipper who dares to offer worship disapproved by Christ or His Church. Such a worshipper and the minister himself who offers the worship affirm by their actions what is not true, namely, either their cults are those approved by Christ and His Church, or if the cult actually be Christ's cult (a schismatic cult, for example) that they are using it with the approval of His Church.

From these distinctions of St. Thomas, we can easily conclude the following:

First of all, that active communication in any religious rite which worships any person or thing other than the one true God is a violation of the virtue of religion by the serious sin of superstition.[29] This would include not only pagan and atheistic rites, but also heretical rites which present for adoration a spurious eucharist. Secondly, to actively communicate in any religious ceremony, which in paying homage to the true God, uses pernicious rites, is likewise to commit the sin of superstition. Examples of these rites are Judaistic rite, Protestant services etc. Thirdly, active communication in true worship offered by a true priest, not however a member of the Catholic Church, also constitutes a superstitious act for the simple reason that it signifies approval of the minister and the sect in whose name he acts.

A word should be said about what might be called "non-Catholic Catholicity." This is a form of superstition which, though not false in its signification, is certainly out of proportion with the end of divine worship.[30] Like the previously mentioned types of superstition, this kind likewise admits of active communication.

Oftentimes, good willed Catholics, priest and lay-folk alike, have a tendency to introduce certain unwarranted practices into their worship: a priest for example, who without any contempt for Church authority, adds an extra *oratio* or prayer at the Mass, or who likes six instead of two candles for his low Masses (the so-called 'religious and liturgical nuts' would be included here), and in general any excessive emotionalism which finds its way into the externality of our Catholic worship. St. Thomas certainly had just such Catholics and their fellow communicators in mind when, treating of superstition, he wrote the following:

> "On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself not conducive to God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the general custom—which, according to Augustine, "has the force of law"—all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious because consisting as it does, of mere externals, it has no connection with the internal worship of God."[31]

Cajetan points out that although such excessiveness is ordinarily only a venial sin, it must not be taken lightly following as it does "under

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[29] Merklebach, *op. cit.*, vol. II, para. 773, p. 764.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] IIa IIae, Q. 93, A. 2, c.

the embrace of superstition" which is directly opposed to divine worship. Such excessiveness could never merit the appelation of Catholic worship. Pope Pius XII in his *Mediator Dei*[32], warns his clergy to be always on the guard for things of this nature.

The second species of sin involved in a Catholic's active communication in non-Catholic religious practices is unbelief.[33] Unbelief stands high on the ladder of evil.[34] We may not be bound always and under every circumstance to confess the Faith, but we are held never in any manner, shape or form to deny it.[35] To participate actively in non-Catholic religious ceremonies is to deny the faith. We may not say in so many words, "By this act I deny the faith," but our actions speak for us. Does not St. Thomas say that outward utterances and deeds are intended to signify inward thoughts.[36] When we actively participate in non-Catholic worship our actions signify two things: first of all, our internal approval of the worship and secondly, that we are believers in the religion whose cult we are now serving.[37] Now both of these things are certainly denials of the Faith, since the fact that there is only one true religion, the Catholic religion, and that this religion alone possesses the one and only cult approved by God, are themselves matters of Faith. Therefore, active participation is objectively a sin of unbelief because it signifies approval of and belief in non-Catholic religious worship. As a sin of unbelief it is *greviously* sinful,[38] and an individual by the very fact that he performs this action, is guilty (at least objectively) of denying his faith. Because this

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[32] Encyclical letter on the Sacred Liturgy, Vatican Library Translation, para. 58-9, pp. 24-5.

[33] A sin of unbelief is an act of the intellect by which one deliberately disbelieves some truth which has been sufficiently proposed to him as revealed by God. The sin of unbelief is committed either directly or indirectly. (a) It is committed *directly*, when one rejects what pertains to faith (its acts, objects or motive); (b) it is committed *indirectly*, when one guiltily places oneself or others in the occasion of danger of unbelief. Direct sins of unbelief are those opposed to the elements that belong to the nature of faith and that are contained in its definition. An act of faith implies in its definition an act of assent to some divinely revealed truth. Opposed to this assent are sins of non-assent. The latter may be either an inward intellectual non-assent or an external non-assent—what is more commonly called, a denial of the faith. This denial of the faith—which is an external act—is either direct or indirect. It is *direct* when one intends to deny the faith; it is *indirect* when one does not intend to deny the faith, but wills to use words, acts etc., which either from their signification or use, or from the meaning that will or may be given them by others, will in the circumstances express a denial of the faith.

Active communication could be either direct or indirect (though probably, most of the time it is the latter). *Briefly then, active communication in non-Catholic religious practices is a direct sin of unbelief being classified as a denial (either direct or indirect) of the faith.* Cf. Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, vol. I, para. 731 & 734 pp. 571-2; McHugh and Callan, Op. cit., para. 815-817, 925, 940, pp. 302-3, 358, 363-4.

[34] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIa IIae, q. 10, a. 3; q. 20, a. 3; q. 34, a. 2.

[35] Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, para. 712-14, pp. 554-7; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, q. 3, a. 2.

[36] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, Q. 3, a. 1, c.

[37] We are not saying that one necessarily does in fact inwardly approve of the worship or believe in the false religion but only that his actions *signify* this approval and belief.

[38] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, Q. 10, a. 3, c.; and Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, vol. I, No. 737, p. 573.

action is of its very nature sinful, it can never be made right. To maintain that the intention of the agent could rectify it is just as absurd as to maintain that the intention of the agent rectifies adultery. The end does not justify the means.

The question naturally arises about worship, Catholic in form, which is under the auspices of a non-Catholic body, for example, baptism by a Protestant minister, or Mass by a schismatic priest. It has already been made clear that active communication in this kind of worship is a sin of unbelief, involving as it does a betrayal of the Catholic religion and an implied recognition of the minister's and sect's authority.[39]

But the difficulty is that the Church at times permits (for example) the reception of the sacraments from the hands of non-Catholic ministers. Obviously, she is not encouraging sins of unbelief. Yes, but in these cases there is no exception to our principle that active communication is always a denial of the Faith.[40] The Church permits such instances only when the circumstances are such that they both eliminate the non-Catholic minister's functioning precisely as a minister of a non-Catholic sect, and also any recognition of the sect as such. In these cases, the Church authorizes the non-Catholic minister to act in her name. Such communication is justified only by the presence of the extraordinary circumstance of extreme necessity and provided any signification productive of scandal, contrary to the Faith, or at least, capable of perverting the Faith, be removed.[41]

We might add that besides being an objective sin of unbelief directly opposed to the virtue of faith, active communication is further aggravated by the fact that it is indirectly contrary to the Faith.[42] For it is evident that a Catholic actively communicating is placing himself in the occasion or danger of unbelief. True, there are circumstances when one can expose himself at least to the remote danger of losing his faith,[43] but he may never do so through active communication, since the latter is intrinsically evil and therefore, never permitted.

We must now consider active communication with reference to charity. Like faith, charity too has an interior and an exterior act. The interior act of charity—an act of benevolent love—is to *will* good to our neighbor; the exterior act, called beneficence, is to *do* good to him.[44] The beneficent man does good not only to his neighbor's body, but to his soul as well.[45]

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[39] Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, vol. I No. 755, p. 585.

[40] McHugh and Callan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 379, para. 970.

[41] Cf. the excellent work by Rev. J. R. Bancroft entitled *Communication in Religious Worship with Non-Catholics*, doctoral dissertation, (Catholic University of America Press, 1943), p. 43.

[42] Cf. footnote no. 33.

[43] Cf., for example, our treatment of public passive communication.

[44] Cf. IIa IIae, Q. 27, & 31, esp. a. 4; Merkelbach *op. cit.*, vol. I, para. 924 ff. pp. 707 ff.

[45] St. Thomas, IIa IIae, Q. 32, a. 2, c.; Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, vol. I, para. 937, p. 716.

Now opposed to the latter, to helping our neighbor spiritually, is the sin of scandal.[46] It is a word or deed, which if not evil in itself, at least has the appearance of evil and offers the occasion of spiritual ruin to another.[47] If the sin of the other person is intended, scandal is called direct scandal; if the sin is not intended but forseen, the scandal is referred to as indirect scandal. But whether the scandal be direct or indirect, it is still ordinarily a serious sin. In fact, in the case of direct scandal, the scandalizer sins not only against charity but also violates that virtue against which the scandalized person sins. A sin of indirect scandal, however, is probably only a sin against charity.

These excellent, distinctions of the Angelic Doctor permit us to draw the following two conclusions; firstly, a Catholic's active communication in non-Catholic religious exercises is or can be the cause of indirect scandal, when the Catholic participator is known to be a Catholic; secondly, by virtue of the nature of direct scandal, a Catholic incurs the multiple guilt[48] involved in an act of active communication, when he induces others to participate actively in non-Catholic religious practices. Guilty of such direct acts of scandal are, for example, Catholic parents who insist on sending their children to non-Catholic schools where they must participate actively in non-Catholic religious exercises. To be guilty of such inducements is to incur the guilt of active communication in non-Catholic religious practices because by inducing to actively communicate one becomes guilty of such communication himself. This is the peculiar nature of direct scandal.

Catholics, "who ask for blessings and sacramentals from non-Catholic ministers; who ask for sacraments from one who is not validly ordained; who ask for sacraments, even a necessary one, from a validly ordained minister, who will administer them in a non-Catholic rite; who ask for a necessary sacrament from a validly ordained minister outside the case of extreme necessity; who request a Mass from a validly ordained priest of a non-Catholic sect,"[49] are certainly guilty of active communication. Besides this, they commit a sin of direct scandal because "To ask another for something which he cannot give without sin is intrinsically wrong, even if he is prepared to sin, because it directly induces at least to the exercise and continuation of the sin."[50]

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[46] Our entire discussion here on the nature of scandal is based on IIa IIae, Q. 43; Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, vol. I para. 957 ff, pp. 730 ff.

[47] This is a definition of what St. Thomas and most modern moralists refer to as active scandal. It is distinguished from passive scandal which is nothing other than the sin or spiritual ruin itself which results in another from the word or deed of some individual. If this word or deed was itself actively scandalous, then the resulting spiritual ruin is referred to as *given* passive scandal. If the word or deed was perfectly all right, but still results in the spiritual ruin of another, this spiritual ruin is called *accepted* passive scandal. (Cf. Merkelbach *op. cit.* vol. I para. 964 ff. p. 735). Unless otherwise stated, the scandal referred to in this paper is active scandal.

[48] Active communication involves the sins of superstition, unbelief, and can involve the sin of scandal (either direct or indirect).

[49] Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p .54.

[50] *Ibid.*

Public Passive Communication

Mere bodily presence at non-Catholic religious exercises is not in itself intrinsically wrong. Still, because circumstances, especially those of danger of peversion to the Catholic, and the danger of scandal to others could make it otherwise, the Church ordinarily forbids such presence. In paragraph 2 of Canon 1258, the Church expresses herself on this matter. What exactly does this paragraph mean? First of all, sin must always be avoided. To freely place oneself in the proximate danger of committing sins either of scandal or perversion of one's own faith is itself sinful and therefore to be avoided at all cost.[51] This is what paragraph 2 means when it says "provided that there is no danger of perversion or scandal present." But usually, and without too much difficulty, these dangers can be made more or less remote. In this case, any proportionately grave reason will justify public passive presence and the lawfulness of such presence can be determined by applying the doctrine of the double effect. The proportionate grave reason and double effect principle are required because even the remote dangers of perversion and scandal are truely evil effects.

The grave reason is *always* required, even if the remote dangers of perversion and scandal were entirely removed. It is required because it is part of the law and "a law passed to guard against a common danger remains binding even for individual cases in which the danger does not exist."[52]

A Canon Law text comments on this,

> "Two reasons may be cited for this rule: in the first place, there is always danger of illusion in judging that the common danger does not exist; second, the relaxation of the rule by private exemption in particular cases would tend to general relaxation."[53]

The principle of the double effect is stated and applied to this matter by the Dominican theologians, McHugh and Callan:[54]

> "It is unlawful for Catholics to assist passively at non-Catholic worship, unless there are present the conditions requisite for performing an act that has two results, one good and the other evil; for even passive assistance frequently involves sin.
>
> (a) Hence, the assistance itself must be really *indifferent* that is, it must be merely passive presence without any active participation in the service. Examples: A person who stands in the rear of a Quaker meeting house as an onlooker assists passively; but one who sits quietly among the others present, as if in meditation, assists actively. A person who sits in a pew during a revival in order to see what is going on assists passively; but, if he joins with the congregation in bowing, groaning, etc., he assists actively.
>
> (b) The evil effect (that is, the remote dangers of perversion and scandal) that may result from assistance . . . *must not be prior to the good effect;* otherwise, evil would be done for the sake of good. Examples: John, a non-Catholic, goes to Mass as a spectator, with his Catholic friend George. He then asks George to assist as a spectator at the services of his denomination,

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[51] Mahoney, *op cit.*, vol. II, Ques. 373, p. 38.

[52] Canon 21, quoted by Bouscaren and Ellis, *Canon Law*, (Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co., 1951), p. 35.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] McHugh and Callan, *op. cit.*, vol. I, para. 966, pp. 377-8.

and thus see for himself that the latter is better. George, in order to be courteous, consents. Here George aims to show politeness, which is good, but the means he uses—namely, the impression he gives that he is not convinced of the superiority of his own religion—is bad.

(c) The evil effect *must not be intended or approved,* but only permitted. Example: Mark, a Catholic public official, has to attend funerals and weddings in Protestant churches as a mark of the public respect for notable persons. He knows that a few will take scandal at his action, but he wishes only to do his duty as an official, and not to offend anyone.

(d) The cause of assistance must be in proportion to the kind of assistance. Hence, a greater reason is required for assistance on several occasions than on one for assistance at infidel than at heretical services, for assistance at the primary than at the secondary act of worship, for assistance by a priest than for assistance by a layman, etc. Example: Graver reasons would be necessary to justify assistance at a non-Catholic funeral, if there were signs of anti-Catholicism manifested (e.g. flower designs and regalia of a hostile sect placed on the coffin), than if the service contained nothing offensive."

The importance scandal plays in Catholic communication with non-Catholics is forcefully brought out by Canon Mahoney.

"The important point, and one to which the Holy See habitually refers in solving doubts, is the necessity of avoiding scandal. This is the point to be examined, before coming to a conclusion in individual cases, rather than a casuistical peering into the distinction between active and passive, civil and religious communication. Even when it is judged to be remote, it must be weighed and considered in relation to the grave reason alleged in justification of passive presence. For example, a graver reason is required in the case of a prominent Catholic than in the case of an unknown person; a graver reason in a small country district, where the actions of everyone are scrutinized and discussed, than in a town where no one cares very much what people do or where they go; a graver reason for a recent convert, owing to the danger of perversion, than for a "born" Catholic."[55]

Private Active Communication

Canon 1258 was concerned only with public communication, active and passive. We must turn our attention now to private communication and first of all, private active communication.

Private communication occurs when the non-Catholic religious exercises are not organized exercises, but engaged in by non-Catholics acting precisely as private persons. The Church does not legislate the manner and form our private devotions should take. If a given private devotion or worship contains nothing contrary to faith, and all proximate dangers of perversion, superstitution and scandal are removed, any proportionate cause will justify a Catholic's active communication in such practices. A proportionate cause is required to balance the evil effects, that is, the remote dangers which might remain. Again the principle of the double effect is to be applied. If even the remote dangers are removed, any good reason at all can justify this communication.

Private Passive Communication

Again all proximate dangers must be removed. Proportionate reasons are necessary to balance the remaining remote dangers. "In the absence

[55] Mahoney, *op. cit.* p. 38.

of all dangers, it seems that any good reason, as one of mere etiquette, would justify it. In the latter event, a Catholic could be passive while his non-Catholic host said a prayer, in which there was some dogmatic error, before a meal, by reason of his being there as a guest."[56]

Summary

1. Being contrary to the virtues of religion, faith and charity, and prohibited by natural, divine and ecclesiastical law, public active communication in non-Catholic religious practices is intrinsically evil and always illicit. Such communication is objectively a serious sin, involving as it does sins which themselves are seriously sinful: superstition, 'ex genere suo' mortal; unbelief; 'ex toto genere suo' mortal, and scandal; 'ex genere suo' mortal.

2. Public passive communication in these practices is licit: (a) when the proximate dangers of perversion to one's own faith and scandal are removed (b) by applying the principle of the double effect to the remaining remote dangers (c) for a grave reason (always required irrespectively of the presence or absence of these remote dangers. The prohibition of the Church (Canon 1258, No. 2) in this regard binds under pain of mortal sin. However, provided all the proximate dangers of perversion and scandal are removed, to passively communicate without a grave reason but out of mere curiosity or without any reason at all, is a venial sin.

3. Private active and passive communication in these practices is licit: (a) when the proximate dangers of perversion to one's own faith and the danger of scandal are removed (b) by applying the principle of the double effect to the remaining remote dangers if these are present, (c) in the absence of these dangers, any good reason can justify these communications.

4. In determining whether some given form of communication has a religious significance or not, the common estimation of the people, especially where the population is made up of Catholics and non-Catholics, is a helpful factor.[57]

In general, the tenor of this paper has been one of severity. Its purpose was to make clear a gap which should and must separate Catholics from their non-Catholic neighbors. We began on the note of aloofness. Cardinal Stritch, who began his Pastoral Letter on that same note of aloofness, concluded:

> "In our country there obtain a variety of religious beliefs. In this condition and in these circumstances we shall live together in charity; and, while we shall not sacrifice one iota of our faith taught us by Holy Mother Church, we shall collaborate earnestly and honestly with our fellow citizens against godlessness in public and social life, against the aggressions and encroachments of those evils which are attacking the very foundations of our democracy.

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[56] Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

[57] Cf. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

To all men of good will we will issue the invitation to join with us and to work with us, even with the limitations which obtain, for that measure of good which is possible for us to secure."[58]

SOME APPLICATIONS [59]

Sacraments and Sacramentals.

1. To seek the sacraments from one who will administer them in a manner alien to the Catholic rite is never licit.

2. In a case of extreme necessity when no lay person, Catholic or non-Catholic capable of baptizing validly is present, a non-Catholic validly ordained priest may administer private Baptism.

3. It is never licit to act as a sponsor in the Baptism of heretics because a sponsor necessarily actively communicates in the rite by seeking Baptism in the name of the one to be baptized.

4. Unless for a grave reason, with the dangers of proximate scandal and perversion to one's own faith being removed, it is not licit to passively assist at such a Baptism.

5. In cases of extreme necessity, when a Catholic priest is not available (physically or morally) and all danger of scandal and perversion are removed, a validly ordained non-Catholic priest may administer Penance or Extreme Unction (and according to some, Viaticum). A Catholic priest is morally unavailable if, for example, an individual could not, except with great difficulty, confess his sins to such a priest.

6. What about a Catholic's co-operating in non-Catholic ministrations to dying non-Catholics? McHugh and Callan respond to this problem with an example:

> "Balba, an Angelican who is sick, wishes her minister to bring her communion. She asks her nurse, Titia, who is a Catholic, to telephone the minister to bring communion, and also directs Titia to prepare an altar and assist the minister on his arrival by lighting the candles, making responses, etc. Titia may not consent, for such immediate cooperation would mean approval of and participation in Angelican rites. . . . If Titia . . . called in an Angelican nurse to receive and fulfill the orders of Balba, she would show that she did not herself approve of the rites, and her act would be indifferent in itself. If she could not avoid telephoning the minister without serious consequences, it would not be unlawful for her to tell him that Balba wished him to call. She might even in great necessity prepare the table herself, but could take no part in the rite. The acts of telling the minister that a visit from him was desired and preparing the table would not be, in the circumstances, approving the rite that followed."[60]

If it is a question of nurses who are Sisters, because of grave inconveniences, they could give the message (i.e. that a member of your sect

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[58] Stritch, *op. cit.*
Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 61 ff.
McHugh and Callan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 371 ff., para. 956 ff.
Prümmer, Vol. I, p. 369 ff., para. 522 ff.

[59] Cf. Merkelbach, Vol. I, pp. 585-589, para. 755-60.

[60] McHugh and Callan *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 388-89, para. 985-86.

wishes a visit) to the minister, because such an action is itself indifferent and permissible for a reasonable cause. It is recommended however, that Sisters ask lay persons to convey the message even though the lay person be a Catholic.

7. To assist actively at the Mass of a non-Catholic priest (unless he is legitimately acting as a minister of the Church in completing a Mass begun by a Catholic priest) or to give a stipend to such a priest for a Mass is never permissible.

8. Mere presence at a non-Catholic religious wedding is subject to No. 2 of Canon 1258.

9. To function as a witness in a marriage celebrated before a non-Catholic minister, or to be a bridesmaid leading the spouse, not to the partner, but to the minister or altar, is never permissible. A Catholic, according to the rules of No. 2 of Canon 1258, may be a bridesmaid or best man leading the spouse to his partner, providing such an action is approved of in the diocese. The latter sometimes does this considering the action not to pertain to the religious part of the ceremony. As a rule, Catholics should refuse to be bridesmaid or best man at non-Catholic religious weddings.

Non-Catholic Churches and Ceremonies.

1. The mere entering of a non-Catholic church (during or outside the times of services) is an indifferent thing and hence licit if it is done (scandal and perversion of one's own faith removed) to look at the church, to avoid the rain, etc.

2. When one is engaged in legitimate public passive communication, he may do whatever is required by good decorum (e. g. standing when others do etc.). Kneeling, however, except in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament, is illicit.

3. Passive communication is never licit if commanded by authority (public or private) out of favoritism for heresy or in hatred of religion. If, however, it is commanded for another reason (e.g. for servants, sailors, soldiers, prisoners, etc.) it is licit to do so to avoid grave inconveniences, providing all proximate dangers of scandal and perversion to one's own faith are removed. Nevertheless, excessive frequentation is rarely free from mortal sin.

4. It is permissable to pray privately before the statues of the Saints, or to manifest reverence to the Blessed Sacrament providing he who does so makes it clear that he is not actively uniting himself with those around him.

5. Any singing or playing of instruments at non-Catholic religious services is never licit.

6. At a civil ceremony, even though a non-Catholic minister offers prayers, it is licit for a Catholic to give an address and for Catholics to attend.

7. It is illicit for a Catholic to give an address at a gathering presided

over by a non-Catholic minister acting as such. However, in case of necessity, it is licit to hold Catholic services in the same building as that wherein non-Catholic services are held.

8. Popular today is the so-called "united worship," that is, a united corporate religious service in which no particular body takes the lead. Such gatherings are based on the conviction that despite the divisions of Christendom, there are still a few fundamental religious truths about which all agree and which provide a foundation on which all may worship God as one body. Precisely because the only kind of religious unity the Church intends and encourages is the acknowledgment by all separated communities of her authority, a Catholic's participation in any 'united' religious body must be subject to Canon 1258. This applies even to such ordinary cases as a Catholic teacher in a non-Catholic school communicating in the act of worship at the beginning of each day, or in any school meeting having a religious significance to it.

9. What about a Catholic's listening to religious lectures, debates etc., given by non-Catholics over the radio, or watching non-Catholic religious ceremonies over television? These are not cases of "Communication in non-Catholic religious exercises" strictly so-called. To qualify as such, physical presence is required. For a well instructed Catholic there ordinarily would be no danger in such things; for one not so well instructed, the danger might be great. The principle to follow is this: except in places where the Ordinary has forbidden such practices, it is up to the individual Catholic to decide on the matter. He must be on his guard against scandal and perversion of his own faith.

10. When public authority demands it, Catholics may swear by touching a non-Catholic Bible, providing this is a common practice and involves no approval of a non-Catholic religious body.

11. To observe non-Catholic religious feast days is illicit. In countries where certain non-Catholic feast days are celebrated by the closing of stores etc., a Catholic is permitted to go along with this especially if by not so doing, grave inconveniences would result.

12. It is illicit to "wear the uniform, ring or emblem etc., of a condemned society, the ring or other emblem of Freemasonry, etc., or make use of other insignia whose sole purpose is to indicate membership in some sect, unless it be evident that these are used for some other purpose (e.g., in order to act a certain part in a play.)."[61]

Funerals and Burials.

1. Paragraph 2 of Canon 1258 pertains to all non-Catholic funerals except civil funerals in the strict sense, which are in no way anti-Catholic. Hence to attend a funeral for reasons of civil duty, of friendship alone, for a suicide case to which the Church has denied burial, is licit.

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[61] McHugh and Callan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 381, para. 976.

2. A Catholic legitimately (i.e. according to rules of No. 2, Canon 1258) present at a non-Catholic religious funeral, may serve as a pall bearer when such an action is approved of by the Diocese. Dioceses do this when such an action is not thought to be part of the religious ceremony itself.

3. A Catholic priest may attend the funeral of a non-Catholic friend or relative, provided he wears his usual street clothes, takes no part in the ceremonies, the danger of scandal being removed, and his connection with the deceased is sufficiently known. In most cases it would be quite difficult to remove the danger of scandal. For priests and laity to pay their respects at the funeral parlor is licit, and in fact the latter might be recommended if it could prevent presence at the funeral itself.

4. If the funeral at the same time be civil and anti-religious (if it be a kind of protest against the denied burial from the Church, or against religion—evident if a great number of freethinkers or Masons are present—or even if a baptized deceased wished to die an apostate, though he did in fact die piously) active communication in the ceremonies at such a funeral is never licit. Passive communication will be licit:

(a) if it does not signify approbation and all danger of scandal and perversion is removed,

(b) if one remains at the service only as long as necessity demands, and,

(c) if one has a very great reason for being present (not ordinary gratitude, friendship, human fear etc.). However, close blood relationship, great temporal loss, etc., seem to be sufficient reasons especially when such a reason can easily be recognized by all.

Thomas Aquinas Morrison, O.P.

ST. RAYMOND OF PENNAFORT, O.P.

IN THE LIVES OF GREAT MEN, many events occur which are illustrative of their greatness. St. Raymond's life almost spanned a century, and during his long career, he is found in the midst of the principal religious and political events of the time. After a brilliant career at the Cathedral School of Barcelona, he was requested by the Bishop and Regent of the School to set up his own classroom. In 1210 he went to Italy, there to enter the famous University of Bologna, and eventually to become one of its foremost professors. After his entrance into the Dominican Order in 1222, he was actively engaged as co-founder with St. Peter Nolasco of the Order of Mercy, personal representative of the Papal legate to Spain, and Papal preacher against the Moors. Amid all of these manifold labors. St. Raymond still found time to leave on record for posterity written proof of the particular genius that was his in the field of Canon Law.

During his professorate at Bologna, between the years 1216 and 1219, Raymond wrote a *Summa Juris,* a work relatively unknown up to modern times and openly unremarked in many of his biographies. It was discovered in manuscript form in the Borghese Library in Rome. The *Summa Juris* begins with these words:

> Frequens instancia et ignis karitas sociorum, nexibus aureis indissolubiliter vinculata, meum diu pulsaverunt animum et quasi pignus amoris aliquod mei laboris memoriale relinquerem eis et posteris profuturum.[1]

St. Raymond composed this *Summa* at the request of his fellow students and professors, so that it might be an aid in preparing them to exercise the sacred ministry.

The most celebrated work from the pen of the Catalonian Doctor is his famous *Summa,* known under various titles as the *Summa Casuum, Summa de paenitentia,* or *Summa de casibus conscientiae.* The task which St. Raymond again proposed to himself in writing the *Summa Casuum* was to assist his confreres by giving them many useful rules for the spir-

[1] A. Vacant, E. Magenat, E. Amann, editors, *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique* (Librarie Letouzey et Ané, Vol. XIII, part 2. Paris, France, 1937), column 1810.

itual direction of penitents and for the ready solution of those cases of conscience most frequently met with in the confessional.

> Ut si quando fratres ordinis nostri vel alii circa judicium animarum in foro paenitentiali forsitan dubitaverint, per ipsius exercitium, tam in consiliis quam in judiciis, quaestiones multas et casus varios ac difficiles et perplexos valeant enodare.[2]

In the long history of the development of works on Penance, the *Summa Casuum* holds a place of exceptional importance. In the early Middle Ages, the manuals of Penance were predominantly practical. For the most part they established the penances to be imposed for particular sins, constituting an almost indispensable book for priests. It was to this moral part much more than to the dogmatic which they gave their attention. The dominating point of view was completely practical. These early manuals gave remedies for helping the penitent and assigned to the priests, themselves not very well educated, the work of bringing consolation to all types of sinners. But there is nothing in these works to indicate where the priest is to turn in order to find the dogmatic foundations for these eminently practical directions. On the other hand, the pastoral part is here fully represented; the examination of conscience, the questioning by the confessor, the modes of imposing penances, all are treated at great length.

The necessity of a manual to fit the needs of the time became much more evident in 1215 after the promulgation of the decrees of the Fourth Council of the Lateran.

Canon 21 of this Council stated that all of the faithful who had arrived at the age of reason were bound to receive the sacrament of Penance at least once a year from their own parish priest. The priest had to examine consciences, pronounce sentence on the cases and fulfill his rôle as judge. Since the ministry of the priest in the confessional held many resemblances to the activity of a civil judge, a transition was easily made from a true Moral Theology to a casuistry often coupled with a one-sided approach from the intricacies of canon law.

Raymond's *Summa* was the first moral manual to introduce a true Moral Theology where before only a casuistic Canon Law had existed. For this reason it marks a definite point in the evolution of Canon Law. The *Summa* enjoyed such great authority in the Order that Masters General, Chapters General and Provincials prescribed it as a textbook throughout the whole Order. Although some within and without the Order did rise against the doctrines of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, everyone treated this magnificent work of Raymond with great respect. In confirmation of their own teachings, professors and theological authors continually called on the authority of Raymond of Pennafort.

The Decretals of Gregory IX

Although St. Raymond's work on Penance is a milestone in the history of Penance and Moral Theology, the work for which he is best known is

[2] *Ibid.*, Col. 1811.

his compilation of the body of laws which has come to be known as the *Decretals of Gregory IX.* We may gain an idea of their historical importance from the fact that they were the code by which the Church was governed from the date of their promulgation on September 5, 1234, until May 19, 1918 when the new Code of Canon Law became effective.

> In other words, for over six hundred and eighty three years the collection of the Decretals made by Saint Raymond was the authentic source of the legislation in the Church. In the course of centuries other laws were added, but the Decretals remained the bedrock in schools and law courts.[3]

Raymond had not yet finished the compilation of the *Summa* when he was called to Rome by Gregory IX for this epic work. Despite his advanced age, he was eighty-two, Gregory ruled the Church with courage and vitality for nearly fifteen years. Himself a canonist and former professor of Canon Law at the University of Bologna, he naturally gave serious consideration to the codification of the existing laws of the Church. In addition to the many pontifical decrees, there were innumerable decrees of local, general and provincial councils, hidden in libraries, tucked away in monasteries, and generally scattered throughout the length and breadth of Christendom. The result was a vast confusion which greatly handicapped the administration of ecclesiastical justice.

From 1100 to 1150, the Camaldolese monk, Gratian, had worked on a brilliantly conceived digest of the then existing law, but many of the pontifical decrees and not a few of the other local decrees had escaped him.

Although this work was incomplete, it became the classic textbook of its day. Gratian had spent the best years of his life in its composition and it was a model of orderliness and clarity. The Dominican, John the Teuton, spent four years editing Gratian's digest and Bartholomew of Brescia brought out still another edition of this work about 1245. Between the years 1181 and 1192, Bernard of Pavia composed his *Brevarium Extravagantium* which was a list of documents which had not been embodied in the work of Gratian.

With the promulgation of the decrees of the Fourth Council of the Lateran, the need for a competent collection of the existing laws of the church became even more imperative. The legal mind of Gregory IX could tolerate confusion no longer. He saw clearly that a codification of Canon Law was the most urgent need that the Church had at the moment. The man most obviously fitted for this enormous task was his confessor, Brother Raymond of Pennafort. Not only had Raymond made a name for himself in the field of Canon Law while at Bologna, but his recent position as personal advisor to the Papal Legate in Spain gave him the added qualification of knowing fully the current needs of the Church.

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[3] Thomas M. Schwertner, O.P., *St. Raymond of Pennafort* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1935), pp. xi-xii.

Toward the end of the year 1227, John Helgrin, better known as John d'Abbeville, arrived at Barcelona as legate of the Holy See to the Kings of Spain. His mission as legate was threefold: the reform of ecclesiastical discipline, the settlement of the problem of the divorce of the king of Aragon, and the investigation of the endless war against the Moors.

The Legate enlisted the assistance of Raymond as his co-worker; one who would journey ahead into the villages preparing the people to receive the Legate. He told the people the purpose of the Papal visitation, and prepared them to receive its benefits. As the Legate entered the village by one gate, Raymond passed out by the other. His work was done; he had made the path smooth and the Legate could take over from there.

> This Friar in his rough patched habit made kings and mighty ones quake with a greater fear than any free-booter hildalgo ever inspired, because he spoke as one having authority and that not of this world; worldly minded prelates who resented the coming of the Legate were soon subdued by the words of one who knew the laws of the Church, and intended to have them enforced in deadly earnest.[4]

With the successful completion of their mission, John Helgrin attempted to persuade Raymond to return to Rome with him, but to no avail. He left him at Barcelona in September 1229. But John Helgrin was not a man to leave in the obscurity of a Spanish convent the eminent religious who had given such invaluable assistance in the success of the mission to Spain. Almost coincidental with his arrival at Perugia, a Bull of Gregory IX commissioned Raymond to preach in the provinces of Arles and Narbonne. Another Bull followed the first with the commission for Raymond to appear at the Roman Court, there to be nominated Papal Chaplain, Penitentiary and later personal confessor of the Pope.

In his position as Papal Chaplain, Raymond was able to observe at first hand the operations of the Roman Curia. Pére Mortier explains that

> the *Cappellanus domini Papae* was a legal consultor, called to deliberate with the Pope on all the questions of law which were handled by the Apostolic Chancery, such as ecclesiastical benefices, appeals to the Holy See, suits between seculars and regulars, or such things as would devolve to the Pope in the confidence from secular rulers. We can see, then, that the scope of his activity was as broad as were the numerous legal quirks, that is to say, unlimited.[5]

In working in such close contact with John Hilgrin's protegé, Gregory was able to evaluate Raymond's legal talent, his zeal for the truth, and his great prudence. John Helgrin had recommended him as a tried and competent canonist. His work in Spain gave him the opportunity to see the

[4] *Ibid.* p. 54.

[5] Le *Cappellanus domini Papae* était un jurisconsulte, appelé à délibérer avec le Pape sur toutes les questions de droit qui ressortissaient à la chancellerie apostolique, soit qu'il s'agît des dénéfices ecclésiastiques, des appels au Saint-Siège, des litiges entre séculiers et réguliers, or même d'affaires civiles dévolues au Pape par le confiance des princes. On le voit, le champ deson activité était aussi vaste que celui de la chicane, c'est-à-dire illimité. Pere Mortier, O.P., *Histoire des Maitres Généraux de L'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs* (Alphonse Picard et Fils, Vol. 1. Paris, France, 1903), p. 275.

needs of the Church at first hand, and since his work was to be not only that of compiler but also of interpreter, the Spanish sojourn was of extreme importance.

Raymond's task was twofold: to collect into one book all the decretals contained in the previous compilations and those made by Gregory himself; secondly, he was to order and edit the body of law, rejecting those laws which were superfluous, and untangling the numberless legal oppositions and contradictions to be found in the existing decrees.

The new compiler carried on his work with a feverish activity. In the short space of four years, he achieved the new codification of Canon Law; one which was officially promulgated by the Bull *Rex Pacificus:*

> Volentes igitur ut hac tantum compilatione universi utantur in judiciis et in scholis districtius prohibemus, ne quis presumat aliam facere absque sedis apostolice speciali.[6]

The great universities of the time received the work with wide acclaim and it soon became the subject of public lectures and commentaries. Its students became known as "Decretalists." From that time down to our own, the universal canonical teaching was given according to the order of the "Decretals of Gregory XI", called the legal order.

The promulgation of the Decretals by the Bull *Rex Pacificus* on September 5, 1234, signaled the completion of Raymond's monumental work. Gregory's satisfaction with the work was so complete that he wished to give public recognition to Raymond. He was nominated Archbishop of Tarragona. The man who had accepted the staggering work of the decretals without protest recoiled from the thought of the episcopal honor. The very thought of the archbishopric so affected his health that his life was despaired of. Bollandus very aptly states the case when he says:

> Nam cum Gregorius Archiepiscopatum Tarraonensem ei deferri decrevisset, id ille adeo graviter et moleste tulit, ut illico febri correptus aliquot dies ingenti corporis animique dolore torqueretur . . .[7]

At the intercession of several of the cardinals, Gregory withdrew his nomination, and instead permitted Raymond himself to select a successor to the see of Tarragona.

The arduous task of compiling the Decretals, coupled with his recent sickness, broke the health of Raymond. Upon the advice of the Papal doctors, he left Rome in April, 1236, to return to his native Spain where he arrived in June or July. In spite of the renown he had achieved, Raymond left Rome as he had come, a poor Friar. The Roman courtiers, noting his meagre baggage as he left the Eternal City, remarked that "just as this man came to the Roman Curia, so he leaves it, because truly nei-

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[6] Franciscus Balme and Ceslaus Paban, O.P., editors, *Raymundiana* (Rome: In Domo Generalitia Ordinis Praedicatorum, 1898. Vol. VI, Fasc. 1), p. 24. This is part of the series *Monumenta Historica Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum.*

[7] Joannes Bollandus, S.J., *Acta Sanctorum* (Paris: Victor Palme Vol. 1. 1864) p. 410.

ther great favors nor the favor of gold nor the offer of great dignity could turn his soul from its firm humility."[8]

Raymond arrived in Barcelona in the year 1236. His arrival did not pass unnoticed. A reputation for great holiness and wise council brought men of all classes to the door of the Convent of St. Catherine. The office of Grand Penitentiary, which he still held, occupied so much of his time that he wrote to Gregory IX and asked to be relieved of the duty. Raymond obtained his request, but the Pope and the successors in the office of Penitentiary continued to consult him on most important matters. Thus Raymond retired to a rare and short-lived peace in his beloved convent in Barcelona.

This retirement was indeed of brief duration. At the General Chapter of 1238, which met at Bologna to elect a successor to Jordan of Saxony, Raymond was its unanimous choice. Raymond, who did not assist at the Chapter, was overwhelmed with surprise when a delegation was sent to Barcelona to persuade the Saint to accept his election. After fruitless resistance, he bowed before the insistence of the commission.

From the beginning of his generalship, Raymond concentrated on providing the Order with a new version of the Dominican Constitutions. This had been approved in the first General Chapter held in 1228 under the second master general, Jordan of Saxony. This new edition of St. Raymond was confirmed by the Order in 1241. It has since remained the foundation of the Constitutions and of all the legislative matters of the Order. In 1924 this work was completely revised in conformity with the new Code of Canon Law.

In 1239 Raymond convened the 19th General Chapter of the Order. He proposed a decree whereby the Order was obliged to accept the voluntary resignation of a superior when he had a just cause to resign. The Chapter approved this proposal. In the Chapter which convened at Bologna in the following year, Raymond, making use of this privilege, demanded the right to resign the Generalship. The Fathers of the Chapter were unbending in their opposition to this request, but to the chagrin of the entire Order, at his continued insistence they finally consented. This caused such a violent protest against the "weakness" of the definitors that another law was passed forbidding the Capitular Fathers to accept the resignation of a Master General, except for the same reasons that could be given for his deposition or for any notable laxity in fulfilling his office. According to some historians, the definitors who accepted Raymond's resignation were all deprived of their offices in the General Chapter of 1242.

Raymond retired to the convent at Barcelona, but there he was far from idle. He propagated the apostolate among the Jews and the Moors

[8] Vir iste qualis intravit Romanam curiam, talis exiit, quia revera nec eminencia gratiarum nec favoris aura, nec sibi oblate dignitatis ambicio ipsius animum ab humilitatis constancia potuit immutare. Balme and Paban, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

of Spain and Africa, also working with great success against the heretics of Catalonia and Spain. In addition to this he preached the crusades, reaping rich harvests in this work. It was Raymond who persuaded James I to introduce the Inquisition into Spain.

One of Raymond's projects was the erection of several schools of oriental languages for future missionaries. He also founded at Tunis a school of Arabic, among whose first students was Raymond Martin, the famous controversialist against the Jews. Endeavors of this kind made it possible for the Friars to exercise a fruitful ministry among the Moors of Spain and among the Arab speaking population of Africa and Asia. In spite of the opposition of some of his own brethren, the enterprise received the official approval of the General of the Order. Under the initiative of the Saint a school of Hebrew was opened at Murcia to facilitate the ministry among the Jews in Spain. In 1281, another such school was founded at Barcelona. It was at Raymond's earnest behest that St. Thomas Aquinas composed his *Summa Contra Gentiles,* a work which contributed so much to the great success of the missionary schools founded by the Saint.

The first news of Raymond's last illness drew crowds of the faithful to his bedside. All visited him to recommend themselves to his prayers and to obtain his last blessing. After a long life of heroic sanctity, the Catalonian Doctor died on January 6, 1275 in the city of Barcelona. Four years after his death the Archbishop of Tarragona instituted a pétition for Raymond's canonization. In December 1297, the Council of Tarragona took steps to introduce the cause of his beatification. Three centuries later, in 1601, he was raised to the altars of the Church by Pope Clement VIII.

For Dominicans, St. Raymond's life will always stand as an example of steadfastness, generosity, magnanimity and great studiosity. The contributions that he made not only as Master General, but also in his capacity as founder of Orders, canonist, preacher, missionary, and counsellor of all, will always be a brilliant jewel in the crown of Dominican endeavor. The work that he accomplished in the field of Canon Law has proved to be a rich mine of all subsequent canonists, providing in no small measure the foundation for the work of such men as the Dominican, Francis de Vittoria.

Raymond of Pennafort has been officially numbered among the canonized saints of the Roman Catholic Church. This is proof positive that the work which he undertook so successfully, the life he led, gave convincing evidence of living the Dominican vocation in its fullness. Raymond of Pennafort is a canonized saint of the Church. What more can be asked of a son of St. Dominic?

Mannes Gambro, O.P.

BERESHITH

Dynamic Life, alone, of Will
And Intellect Divine—until,
Sheer Love, Fire-fused, it freely burst to share
Itself with creatures. Heaven had no heir.
God would create! His breath,
Pure life, would fill the depth
Of nothing. Love cascaded down
To manifest its glory—crown
And end of all. The Empyrean's ring
In measured, flowing time began to swing.

Song of the spheres in harmony,
An ordered chord, God's sympathy
Yet, of themselves, do but reflect a trace,
The footprint of Omnipotence in space!
Nay more—much more is here!
For angels, men, their clear
Prismatic images portray
God's very Face, mirrored Jahweh.
Will's wild way, mad discordant theme is heard;
"Non serviam!" strikes up eternal dirge.

Spilled glory maimed! Though God foresaw,
He never formed this spectre's maw.
Sin's stained slime is creature's unhelped bent
To naught. "Without me, fruitless efforts spent.
Divine Law is man's rule—
Unheeded, damns the fool.
All other evil, good's disguise,
Enhances beauty." God, All-Wise,
All-love, the curtain drew for man to see
His hope, Divine Fruit on Redemption's Tree.

Melchior Wyss, O.P.

[1] EDITOR'S NOTE: During the past scholastic year at St. Rose Priory, Dubuque, Iowa, the tract on Creation was expounded in The Class of Dogmatic Theology. In conjunction with their class work the students were strongly encouraged to write a poem on the lofty and inviting subject of Creation. The above work was chosen by the students themselves as the most outstanding product of this endeavor.

THE SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM[1]

For wisdom is an infinite treasure to men, which they that use, become the friends of God, being commended for the gift of discipline.[2]

Man was born for contemplation. In confirmation of this, witness his intellectual and moral quest for truth down through the ages. Nor was the search always a pleasant one, for error and fantasy frequently arose as obstacles in his path. But despite these hazards, on firmer and easier ground, he was eventually led back to a perennial system of thought. Examining this harrowing experience of mankind, we come upon several striking facts—certain and evident principles. Contrary to the purely physical and psychical tendencies of modern educational experts, man does desire to know. He is seeking, not a place on earth, but a place in heaven. Through love he ultimately attains this eternal destiny.

True love is born of truth itself: a more extensive grasp of knowledge provides greater capacities for loving. By definition, science generates the kind of truth the mind and heart of man so urgently desire: truth about which there can be no doubt, seen in the light of its fundamental reasons and causes. But the transition from ignorance and wonder to the perfection of scientific knowledge is no easy task. Just as a rough diamond must be cut and polished to expose its hidden perfections, so too, those who seek to uncover the perfections of true science must first look about for a method of scientific thinking.

In the Scholastic tradition it is the liberal arts which offer the student the general methodology required for all scientific endeavor. They are as paths leading the mind to the knowledge necessary for that contemplative union which is man's last end—the vision of God in Heaven.

In any human endeavor, man encounters many impediments to his progress toward any desired goal. This is no less true of his desire to

[1] "Legimus, Salomone dicente, per quem ipsa se cecinit [Sapientia]—*Sapientia aedificavit sibi domum, excidit columnas septem* (Prov. IX, 1). Quae sententia licet ad divinam pertineat sapientiam . . . vel Ecclesiam . . . tamen sapientia liberalium litterarum septem columnis confirmatur; nec aliter ad perfectam quemlibet deducit scientiam, nisi his septem columnis vel etiam gradibus exaltetur." (Beatus Flaccus Albinus [Alcuin], *Opp. Didascalica,* Operum Pars VII, [PL 101, 853]).

[2] Wisd. 7:14.

know; the major difficulties arising, paradoxically, from his unique knowing powers. The intellect is often hindered in its operation, either because it has received a distorted or incomplete image from the sense powers, or because there is present in the intellect some previously formed judgment to which it firmly adheres. Certainly the previous judgments which man has made strongly influence his future actions. In this matter the simple apprehension of the intellect by which we know simple essences are free from guilt, for only the operations which precede and follow upon this act introduce error into human thought. Still another principle of error is the habit of keeping ideas in complete disorder which results in erroneous judgments and other mental distortions.

Since the body is created to serve the intellect, it is necessary to treat briefly the impediments arising in those sensible faculties which contribute to the formation of the image in which the universal of the intellect exists implicitly. The external senses, which are in themselves infallible, err only insofar as the sensible organ is defective, or simply in lack of attention. With regard to the internal senses, we find that obstacles arise from the constant interaction between them and intellect. The intellect is in error when it lacks order, and thus it can hardly work consistently and accurately with the internal senses.

Impediments to the proper functioning of the intellect and sensible faculties may be lessened by a sound system of education. To this end the liberal arts assist the intellect in ordering its ideas, and through this order and rectification a more perfect image is formed by the senses.

Man is concerned with finding the right reasons for things. In order that his search be successful, he must become adept at consistently following the dictates of right reason. Virtue adds this note of consistency, for virtue is nothing more than a habit which enables a man to do something well.

Man can use his will to love many different types of things, he can direct his reason to contemplate a quasi-infinite field of objects, but it is a poor lover and a poor thinker who allows his powers to roam casually and freely over a world of manifold beauties and truths. This moral and intellectual wanderlust can be controlled only by directing the intellect and will so that they can easily concentrate on certain classes of objects. This directing of a power or faculty is synonymous with the definition of virtue, a good operative habit. We can tell whether a habit is good or not by observing how closely it is in accord with man's goal of happiness, the contemplation of truth.

Next we must single out the different kinds of virtue, so that we may decide among which particular virtues the liberal arts can be placed. The virtues are seen most clearly in relation to the purpose or end for which they are acquired. But here we must be cautious, for one and the same object may be related to different individuals in a variety of ways. An apple,

for example, is related in different ways to a hungry urchin, and to scientist who seeks to know its physical properties.

The moral virtues are those which bear the heavy burden of directing both the intellectual and sensible appetites to embrace that which is simply good. The perfection of the moral virtues leaves nothing to be desired in an individual, for when this perfection is attained a man is completely good. The virtues which stabilize the search for the *intelligible* or *sensible* good are of necessity really different one from another, because their objects differ in kind. It is the difference between looking for a notion of hell and looking for a match, one immaterial, the other material. The intellectual virtues are virtues in a special sense only, for even when they are attained, unless the moral virtues are also perfectly established in the subject, there is no assurance that the individual will be completely good.

Our principal concern is with the intellectual virtues, for it is clear that if the liberal arts are virtues at all, they must be relegated to the realm of the intellectual.

The intellectual virtue of *science* as understood in the Scholastic tradition is the habit of obtaining knowledge according to strictly logical reasoning from certain, evident, and universal facts. There are, of course, great quantities of knowledge which fail to scale these heights of perfection. Knowledge of this kind is arrived at by a dialectical process.

In any comprehensive discussion about the cognitive processes, we inevitably come face to face with ideas. Ideas are either embraced for their own sake or become the principles of some operation which takes place outside the realm of thought. A man building a home draws up a plan in his mind; but simply to think about the plan is not valued for its own sake. The reason for the plan is to protect the man from making mistakes and to direct him in the actual construction of the house. Obviously, all practical knowledge, if it is to be practical at all, presupposes some speculation. On the other hand, practical knowledge is certainly incomplete with merely speculative ideas to back it, for the practical is directed to the singular and not to the more universal plan.

The practical order presents two basic goals, providing a foundation for dividing the practical sciences. If the goal is the ultimate happiness which all men naturally seek, then the moral sciences or prudences come into play. For a man's actions are morally virtuous when they are in conformity with his natural end. But if the ultimate end is not the goal, and man-made things, not human actions, are our primary concern, we find ourselves in the realm of the arts. It is important to note that everything which man does must be subordinated to his ultimate end. The arts must themselves be subordinated to prudence, for when it is vicious, art is not art at all.

Now that speculative science has been distinguished from prudence and art, we are confronted with knowledge which is in some respects speculative and in others practical. In art itself we can discern three things: a work to be made, the manipulation of materials, and the completion of the product. In each of the arts, one of these phases is accentuated, and we shall categorize them accordingly. *Inventive* art is concerned principally with the consideration of how something is to be made, *executive* art with the actual making. We are accustomed to call the arts which direct other arts *architectonic.* An example would be a playwright who directs his own production. We can see, then, that both architectonic and inventive arts are scientific insofar as they have theoretical and demonstrable aspects. A good example of this is the field of medicine which is scientific in theory while in practice it is an art. Science and art obviously overlap; but they do not coincide.

Having noted the differences between science and art, it is now our task to determine what precisely is the nature of the liberal arts. We must note at the outset that the liberal arts do not fit easily into the scheme which we have just proposed. Logic, for example, is both an art and a science, at once speculative and practical. How shall we resolve this tangle? Our first task is to explain the meaning of the term liberal, and then delve into the very nature of art itself.

A friend may do for his loved one the very same task which a servant does for his employer. The reasons which motivate their work, however, will be completely different. The lover freely does what the servant is bound to do. In like manner, knowledge is truly *liberal* when it is acquired strictly for its own sake and not as a means for the accomplishment of some further work or knowledge. A glance at the object of theology is sufficient to impress upon us the fact that, of all the sciences, the one which seeks to understand most about God is the truly liberal science in the strictest sense. It is possible, however, to conceive of the other theoretical sciences as liberal when we understand that the speculative intellect has for its goal the truth under consideration, not some external operation. All of the other theoretical sciences, and primarily metaphysics, are ordered to theology. Outside of these two wisdoms, the notion of "liberal" decreases insofar as the desired knowledge is of truths more remotely ordered to that knowledge of God which is man's last goal.

We can expand our idea of "liberal" in order to include prudence and the moral virtues, for they pertain essentially to the good life of a free man, the life of free and deliberate choice. It is in this sense that the liberal arts are said to be truly liberal. Certainly their end is knowledge for its own sake; furthermore, they are suited to and in a sense necessary to the individual who seeks the free life which prudence and the moral virtues afford.

The traditional meaning of the term *art* still remains to be manifested. The scholastics, following their predecessors, were accustomed to refer

to motions of the intellect and its appetite as "actions." Action designated a motion or operation which began and ceased within the agent. But it ultimately passed outside the agent and terminated in producing a change in an external natural thing. They called this operation "making." These two different functions are the objects of prudence and art respectively, for they are directed to reasonable actions and to external products. Because their objects differ, a separate habit is required for the perfection of an intellectual action and a reasonable making. It is evident that art in the strict sense cannot be speculative. Art is the intellectual virtue which directs the intelligent making of something *outside* the mind, while speculative activity must end in a truth *in* the mind. Nor can art, strictly speaking, be liberal, because the making of things involves matter, and matter, determined as it is, imposes limitations and restrictions on man's immaterial soul. This type of art is properly called servile art.

At this point difficulties arise. If the liberal arts are indeed liberal, then they are not arts at all. If truly arts, how shall we call them liberal? The solution of this seeming paradox is a major conclusion of this exposition.

Using our definition of art, *the virtue of intelligent making,* the solution is not difficult. The liberal arts involve not only knowledge but also a kind of "work," a work which is within the mind itself. They are called arts by a kind of similitude, and they are called liberal in order to differentiate them from the servile arts, such as sculpturing or painting. Examples of the mental "work" on which the term art is based are easily found in logical syllogisms and geometrical measurements. The speculative reason makes certain things in a determined manner, so that in its "work" the notion of art can easily be realized.

At this point we must show how the mind "makes" things within itself, in order that we may have a clearer knowledge of the artistic character of the liberal arts.

The word "making," as we have already seen, refers to the manipulation of materials which exist outside the mind. This is the common and most correct use of the term. We should only add the notion that the "making" puts a form into the materials, according to some definite purpose which the maker has in mind. The carpenter, for example, puts the form "house" into a quantity of lumber and plaster. In all the servile arts the matter is genuinely physical, and the maker can inform it in two ways: either by simply changing the position of the matter, the process involved in making a table, or by causing a change to take place in the materials, as the synthesis of chemicals by fire. It is true that the natural agents cause the change, but they do so only under a guiding hand. Many are inclined to cringe at Joyce Kilmer's statement that "only God can make a tree," but it is a truism so obvious that we might possibly miss the point. Man cannot make an object which has within itself a natural principle of action.

In the liberal arts, we have *adapted* the term art to mean the intellectual virtue which directs the "making" of something in the mind itself. This product cannot be a physical object, because the mind has no capacity whatever for actualizing this matter. Similarly, the mind cannot produce matter by simply thinking of a being which could plausibly exist. The intellect is a cognitive, not a creative faculty; it cannot make many of the things it knows.

But our minds do have the power to make some objects of knowledge, which we call "beings of reason." These imitate real beings, but differ from them in that they cannot possibly exist outside the mind. Some of these are *negations* conceived as something *positive,* for example, "darkness" or "nothingness." Others are *relations* produced by mentally comparing one thing with another. Of these some in turn are produced by a comparison of things known precisely as they are known, second intentions, others by a comparison of things considered in their real existence, first intentions.

The mind produces negations only as a substitute for more perfect concepts. Every art and science occasionally makes and uses such concepts, but the relations of reason sometimes have a more important and special use. Second intentions are needed by the mind in arranging all its knowledge in an orderly way. In every judgment that we make, for example, we need to order our concepts as "subject" and as "predicate." This relation is made by the mind between its concepts precisely as they are known. The liberal arts which make this kind of a mental being for the purpose of ordering our thoughts are the *logical arts.*

Relations of reason which are considered as first intentions are used in many sciences. Thus in psychology we speak of color as "seen," although it is the eye which depends on color to see, not color upon the eye. But only in one science do these relations play anything more than an incidental role. This is in mathematics. In mathematics we study a real object, quantity, but we consider it under a special aspect, precisely as *measurable.* Every entity studied in mathematics is defined in this way. Discrete quantities (numbers) are defined by *counting;* continuous quantities (lines, surfaces, solids) by *congruence.* But counting and measuring by congruence produce relations of reason. They *equate* a particular quantity with another according to a choice made by the thinker. To be sure, the equality or inequality of two lines or two numbers is itself a *real* relation, but the actual measurement of one by another is the work of the mind and produces a merely mental relation. Thus in mathematics we also have, in a sense, an artistic work or construction. This provides for a second class of liberal arts, the *mathematical.* No others are possible, since none of the other theoretical sciences considers its object under such a constructive aspect.

We can conclude, then, that the only works of art which can be produced in the mind are *logical* and *mathematical* constructions. Within

these two spheres the liberal arts can be divided exhaustively. The logical department embraces the *linguistic arts.* These include the fashioning of all beings of reason, whether dialectical constructs or mere poetic "fictions." The other group contains the *mathematical* or *quantitative arts.* Tradition has long referred to the linguistic arts as the *Trivium,* calling the quantitative arts the *Quadrivium.* Linguistics and mathematics are intellectual virtues. As such, they add formality to the liberal arts, since these specific virtues add the note of consistency in the ordering of man's knowledge, ultimately directing him to the achievement of eternal truth.

There are many subjects in the schools today which parade under the banner of the liberal arts. However, it is our purpose to include in this division only the traditional constituents which have never been the object of serious objection.

An art is called linguistic or logical when it utilizes the relation of the mind for the purpose of directing the thinking power in its pursuit of truth. The term "linguistic" expresses a means of communication which uses words or signs. This art is fundamentally divided into *grammar* and *logic.* Although the traditional view includes rhetoric, we shall see that rhetoric is merely another sub-division of logic.

Grammar treats of the appropriate conventional signs used in the communication of ideas between individuals. Having ordered our ideas with the incidental situation in view, we must seek the most apt means for expressing them. Words have a knack for being inadequate. Consequently, the utmost caution must be observed in choosing precise words for the best expression of our thoughts. Under the general heading of grammar we ought to place spelling, writing and pronunciation, and then classify all of them as *pre-liberal,* since they are at the service of the others.

Logic is the art of all the arts and sciences, because it directs the mind to an easy, ordered, and unerring pursuit of truth by means of an analysis of mental relations. We call logic in the strict sense of the word, judicative or *analytic.* Insofar as it analyzes either the formal coherence of the reasoning process or the perfection of the "material" which is the product of that rational process, it is divided into material and formal logic. These are, however, merely two different aspects of the same virtue. A civil judge, in exercising the virtue of justice, must consider not only what a culprit has done, but also the circumstances which accompanied the deed.

Other less perfect arts are annexed to logic. They are required for reasoning about matter less adequate for scientific demonstration. These arts are called either *sophistics* or *dialectics*: sophistics, because they serve logic in exposing monstrosities of reason; dialetics, insofar as they seek the truth by exploring the diverse ways of finding it. If, however, the latter quest uncovers principles required for the solution of a problem, then it abdicates in favor of logic itself: but if it fails, it remains for *inventive logic* to improve upon the preceding dialectical process.

Dialectics has two very important parts which we name *topical* and *affective.* Topical logic has as its goal the formation of an opinion. Although directed to doubtful material, it strives to arrive at the best choice of two alternatives. Unfortunately, it is never capable of choosing one opinion to the exclusion of the other. The roving topical logician, unable to find proper principles, ranges through the whole of human knowledge, seeking any light he can find. In this manner, he bears a certain similarity to the metaphysician and theologian, who, being universal scientists, treat of all things, although under the light of far different principles.

Affective logic, on the other hand, deals with matter which has the power of producing only suspicion or light probability. This aspect is of great importance, especially to the Christian apostle. The average man wants to know, indeed, desires to know, not precisely what a thing is, but rather what it is like. The obstacles to man's attainment of truth are due not only to disorders in thought but also to disorders in the appetite. An appeal must necessarily be made through the emotions to generate lesser probabilities or "persuasions" in the mind. The appetites may be affected in a two fold manner, and so affective logic is, accordingly, the subject of a twofold division.

If the purpose of an argument is to set the passions in motion in order to stimulate action in an individual, the virtue or art is called *rhetoric.* If, on the other hand, the argument sets the passions at rest, bringing the soul to the contemplation of truth, is called *poetics.*

Before presenting the division of the mathematical arts, it is necessary to treat briefly that study which in the schools today is commonly called arithmetic. It is more properly called "reckoning" or calculation. Arithmetic is related to mathematics proper in somewhat the same manner as grammar is related to the logical or linguistic arts. Arithmetic is a pre-liberal art and is at the service of the science of algebra, insofar as it deals with the rapid calculation of problems. It is not properly called a science, because it fails to prove the rules by which it is directed.

The mathematical liberal arts are generally divided into pure and applied mathematics, both of these divisions being subject to many subdivisions. Since mathematics treats of real quantities, but only as they are measureable, we divide pure mathematics according to the species of quantity which are measurable in different ways.

Geometry treats of the relations of measurement between continuous quantities, while *algebra* treats of the relations of measurement obtained between discrete quantities. *Applied mathematics* consists in the application of pure mathematics to physical quantity, thus forming the intermediate science of mathematical physics, in which the thought process is mathematical, but the purpose is to understand the moving objects of the physical world. Broadly speaking, this application is approximate, while

the knowledge acquired from it is often dialectical. In its application, therefore, it must be annexed to whatever science or art uses it.

It is easily seen that in applying mathematics to physical objects, there will be a great number of applications, and hence, an indefinite number of difficulties. As a result, many defective arts and sciences will arise. We can, however, reduce these to two general classes. Where the application of mathematics is to physical quantity for the intelligible rendering of natural properties, we use the term *mathematical physics.* A very good example of this is the study of *astronomy.* Again, the application of mathematics to a physical quantity can be made for the purpose of making an artificial object more intelligible, since the order of a thing manifests its esthetic quality. Although this process is found in all the liberal and fine arts which deal with subjects having quantitative order, it is found principally in *music,* because the proportions in music are highly exact, determinate and under the control of the artis.

It is evident from the historical experience of the ages that man's intellect, darkened by the fall, and left to its own initiative, ranges in thought from the sublime to the fantastic. Something is required to stabilize it, and direct it constantly to its goal, to that First Divine Truth from which inferior truths derive their integrity. We have seen that this stabilizing influence is nothing more than a good operative habit. Virtue strengthens, extends, and liberates the powers of man, preventing him from stumbling over the impediments to his powers of knowing and loving. The liberal arts are the actualization of the innate power of the intellectual faculty to learn, in an orderly, facile, and unerring manner, the dazzling panorama of the commonplace things about us, and to come to know the Divine Reason for their manifestation. No sacrifice can be too great which is ordained to the fulfillment of this ultimate human endeavor—man's last end, the eternal vision of God.

Benedict Meis, O.P.

PATTERN FOR THE PAST

WITHIN THE PAST TWO HUNDRED YEARS, there has been a growing interest in the philosophy of history. Repeated attempts have been made to reduce historical data to definite philosophical principles. The reason for this frantic search into the past lies mainly in the intellectual and moral turmoil of modern society. In the short span of fifty years, two great wars have threatened to uproot the foundations of Western civilization and culture. God has been banished; man has turned to worshipping himself. But the new man-god has done little more than hasten the day of his own destruction. Rejecting the notion of Divine Providence, he anxiously probes into the past, seeking some infallible pattern in the intricate tapestry of history, a pattern to provide answers to his present problems and to guide him in the future.

Actually, the term "philosophy of history" is a misnomer. Unless philosophy is taken in the rather broad sense of "generalization" or "reflection", there can be no such thing as a philosophy of history. The reason for this is that history is not a science. Science is clear, evident, and certain knowledge acquired through demonstration. Science deals with universals, not particulars. Since it is concerned with singular, contingent events, history cannot be included in the definition of science.

For this reason, we find no "philosophy of history" in the scholastic tradition. Aristotle considered history to have even less of a scientific appearence than poetry. History for Aristotle meant a record of facts. These facts need not refer to past events alone. Take, for example, the *Historia Animalium*. This work is just a collection of zoological data along the lines of a laboratory analysis. This use of the word "history" survives today in the expression "Natural History."

Since history cannot properly be called a science, what, then, is it? We can gather some insight into this question from the nominal definition of history. History is generally taken to mean a systematic study of the past—a discipline by which singular, past events are presented in an orderly manner. But modern historians are not satisfied with a mere recording of the past. They wish to interpret historical data, to assign rea-

sons to them. In other words, they wish to attain not merely *quia* knowledge of the past, but *propter quid* knowledge as well. This then is the problem: can history provide causal explanations of the past?

Considering history as it is *quia* knowledge, knowledge of facts, we must first discuss the nature of its subject. History is about singulars; it cannot be a science since science treats of universals. But if we use "science" in a rather loose sense to mean a discipline or methodical knowledge, history easily falls within this classification, provided its subject has some kind of necessity and if there are means by which this subject can be known.

Necessity is either intrinsic or extrinsic. A contingent singular can have no intrinsic necessity since it need not be. Extrinsic necessity, on the other hand, can be attributed to singulars: either as they come to be, because they are contained in the infallible and eternal decrees of God, or as they are facts which have necessity *in sensu composito*. The eternal decrees of God can be known only through divine revelation. As such, they do not fall into the sphere of purely human science. But facts which have necessity *in sensu composito* can be the subject of human science. Under what aspect can we consider singulars to have necessity *in sensu composito*? Only in the sense that in no way could these singulars at the same time have existed and not existed. But considered in themselves, *in sensu diviso,* these same singulars *could* very well never have been at all.

There are two ways in which the past as such can be known—with certitude and with probability. The past is known with *certitude* by the testimony of reliable witnesses. This reliability depends upon a twofold criterion: first, that the witnesses know the facts, having been in a position to obtain the necessary information; and second, that the witnesses be truthful. These two conditions are in turn verified by applying the testimony to the principles of psychology and moral science. Since psychology is a part of physical science, and since moral science by reason of its principles is subordinated to physical science, the certitude of history, insofar as it is *quia* knowledge, is reducible to physical science.

But the past can also be known with *probability* by the testimony of such less reliable witnesses as internal evidence, the consistent nature of the testimony itself, and conjecture. But here logic must be used, as well as a dialectical process which employs principles and truths borrowed from all the sciences. In this way, when the material with which he must work contains rather sparse information, the historian is equipped to bridge the gaps which remain in the evidence at hand.

Thus we can say that history as it is factual knowledge is a *rational discipline which considers the past as such,* or, more precisely, *singular, contingent, past events which have extrinsic necessity.* The past is known

primarily by the testimony of reliable witnesses and secondarily by dialectical conjecture based upon the principles of logic and physical science.

In attempting to explain history as it is, in a certain sense, *propter quid* knowledge, that is, knowledge of the reasoned fact, we are again faced with the problem of the subject of history. Historical events are singular events, and to discover their *propter quid* we would have to find the reason for their very singularity. Now we know many reasons for historical events in the sense that we know their causes. We know, for example, that Brutus stabbed Caesar, yet to know *why* this unique individual Brutus had to be the murderer of this unique individual Caesar is not possible.

But if God reveals an outline of history as it is contained in His divine decrees, we can certainly achieve some amount of explanatory knowledge of historical events. He has done just this in the Old and New Testaments. In this unique Sacred History we find not only the outline for all past historical events, but also a prophetic scheme of events that are yet to come. In addition to this divinely provided outline rooted in the certitude of faith, we can also arrive at *conjectural* explanations of singular events. These explanations are deduced with probability from what is more certain. St. Augustine's *City of God* is an example of this type of history, written in the light of theology, and containing both certain and conjectural explanations of the singular facts of history.

Since it is impossible to penetrate the hidden purposes of God by the unaided light of human reason, *propter quid* knowledge in the rational discipline of history is impossible if certitude is demanded. To claim such a possibility would be to fall into the serious errors of absolute determinism found in the philosophical systems of Hegel and Marx. By reflecting upon the established facts of history in the light of some science, however, we can achieve a *conjectural* type of the rational explanations of singular events. While a science cannot *demonstrate* the significance of any singular as such, it can provide a key to understanding that significance more clearly. We can state in a general way the value of singulars and from this we may proceed conjecturally to their value in each unique case. Through this reflection made in the light of the various sciences we can distinguish certain definite classes of conjectural explanations of historical events.

By reflecting upon history in the light of physical science we arrive at *physical history*. This both illustrates and completes physical science by showing how the species of things manifest specific natures through their singular variations in the past. This is especially applicable to the study of the human race, to anthropological history, but physical history can also be extended to consider all the material species embraced by physical science. Thus we have *paleontology, historical geology,* and *historical cosmology*. These branches of physical history, however, should not be confused with natural history. Natural history does not explain singulars

nor does it consider the past as such. It is rather a collection of ordered facts which are quasi-universal and not distinctly singular, facts which provide the material from which physical science makes its deductions. Much of modern anthropology and paleontology, for example, is really natural history since it does not explain the singular as such.

History considered in the light of moral science enables us to make prudential judgments about singular deliberate actions of the past in relation to the true end of action. Most history consists in this moral reflection upon the past by which the historian judges the good or evil of particular events. A study of *moral history* is valuable for perfecting our own prudence and moral science, since the more extended our experience and the more practiced our judgment, the more prudent we may become. This is especially true in the realm of politics where individual experience is necessarily limited and where experimentation is hardly feasible.

Technical history is a study of man's technical achievements in the past made in the light of the arts. Through it we can understand why certain inventions were produced in view of a definite end. This is especially important in a study of the fine arts for developing an understanding of the artist and a more profound appreciation for his work. Thus technical history provides the background or setting which is a necessary aid in the study of art.

History viewed in the light of mathematics is statistical history, an application of the principles of mathematics to physical facts. Through statistical history we can attain a certain calculus of the probability by which any given event can be performed. This has a definite practical application as can be seen from the important role played by statistical history in the study of economics.

When we reflect upon history in the light of metaphysics, two types of historical explanation become apparent. First of all, we know from metaphysics that all finite beings [1] even in their individual differences and singularity reflect God's infinite perfection, and that they exist for His external glory. Thus we can see conjecturally why this or that singular exists, especially under the aspect of its contribution to the cosmic image of God in the Universe. This reflection might be called *cosmic history,* embracing both intelligent and inanimate creatures as they are manifestations of the beauty and divine splendor of the universe. Taken in this sense cosmic history forms an adjunct or supplement to that part of metaphysics which treats of the divine attributes and government.

On the other hand, metaphysics also tells us that the universe is proximately ordered to the perfection of the intelligent creatures which form its apex. Man's ultimate perfection, even in the natural order, consists in the attainment of as perfect a knowledge of God as possible. Since in the

natural order this knowledge must come through creatures, history becomes, as it were, a narration of man's education about God. Thus it is most properly viewed in the light of metaphysics, the supreme wisdom in the natural order, whose object is most suited to the perfecting of man's intellect. Under this aspect, history assumes a certain intelligibility as a providential series of events chosen to lead man to wisdom, to the attainment of truth and the avoidance of error. Nevertheless, this *intellectual history*, as it may be called, also remains conjectural since human reason alone, unaided by divine revelation, can never perceive the heights of wisdom to which man has been predestined by God.

Intellectual history is a valuable tool in our intellectual growth and can assist us in several ways. First of all, it can provide us with intellectual materials. It also proposes the difficulties yet to be solved of individual men who in the past have been aroused to wonder about problems occurring to no one else. Furthermore, it shows us both the intellectual and moral consequences of admitting various principles or supposed principles: whether these point out truths to be retained or errors to be discarded. Intellectual history also points out the methods and conditions, intellectual, moral, and physical conditions, which have either been conducive to the discovery of truth or have precipitated lapses into error.

In addition to these general uses of intellectual history, it also has two special uses which properly pertain to metaphysics. In the first place, history is of assistance to metaphysics in its apologetic role which belongs to it as it is a supreme wisdom. History, for example, can provide extrinsic arguments for the acceptance of first principles and for the strength and vitality of the perennial philosophy; it can also call attention to the sound path of Thomism. In this way, history pertains to the defensive part of metaphysics which is called critica.

Secondly, history can also assist metaphysics in its task of providing an introduction to philosophy for the beginner. The burden of this introductory phase is to arouse wonder in the mind of a beginner, to enkindle therein an intense desire for truth. Since he cannot desire what he does not know, the beginner must be given a foretaste of wisdom, a brief glimpse of metaphysics. This task the metaphysician must perform, and he can supplement it with historical facts chosen to show the difficulty of attaining truth, the necessity for docility in this pursuit, the need for a sound method of procedure, and the possibility of great happiness in the possession of truth. A comparison between the confusion of the sophists and the clarity of Aristotle for example can move one to the right beginning in the pursuit of wisdom.

Besides these general and special functions of history in the natural order, there is a still more important use of history in regards to sacred theology. We have already mentioned the dependence of human reason upon divine revelation for the ultimate explanation of singulars. History,

in turn, can serve theology in a special way. Since one of the purposes of the apologetic section of sacred theology is to present the faith to those who do not yet have it, history can be of great usefulness in manifesting the fact that without the Christian religion man is unable to attain to the perfection of natural reason. In addition to this role in apologetics, history can also furnish *probable* arguments in theology. For example, from the history of philosophical speculation about punishment in the after-life, one might argue with *probability* to the existence of hell.

Having considered briefly the various aspects of the nature of history, we can define it as *the human study of the past as such, known by the testimony of reliable witnesses, and explained, at least conjecturally, by the principles of the perfect sciences, with the purpose of providing them with inductive materials, practical applications, or extrinsic arguments.* Its object is the singular events of the past as such: events which are 'necessary' because they have taken place; events which are known certainly or conjecturally by reliable testimony or by physical remains ('monuments') or by both; events which are contemplated in the light of the principles of physical or moral science, and are explained causally in the light of all the sciences, especially metaphysics and sacred theology.

Francis Shaw, O.P.

ROAD TO EUREKA

THIS PAPER is about that mysterious mental alchemy known as Dialectic. And if it were a novel, its title might be something like "Tom Swift and his Wonderful Catch-All Concept . . ." By a sort of equivocal magic, the word *dialectical* seems to have acquired a hundred different uses. It has become one of those convenient cubbyholes where we discard all the bits and pieces that fail to fit neatly into an initially oversimplified pattern of knowledge. A term will slip into the classroom discussion, or is read in the text. It is a general term, appearing often in the critical vocabulary; no one seems to know its exact referent, but it has enough vague connotations to make it intellectually comfortable. Sooner or later, this term evolves into a handy all-purpose label, to be pasted by the student onto anything not especially definitive, divisive, or demonstrative in a scientific exposition. Many times we are tempted to call something "dialectical" simply because we are at a loss to know what else to do with it. In the scholastic tradition, fortunately, there are few terms able to enjoy such an office; but if we were to take a quick survey, "dialectical" would probably share undisputed first place with "metaphysical". Eventually, however, as studies progress, "metaphysical" gains a somewhat more precise usage. The same cannot be said, on the whole, of "dialectical", since Dialectic is not the subject of a formal discipline in the *Ratio Studiorum*. It seems only fair that some attempt be made to rescue this forgotten habit from the attic of ambiguity.

The art of Dialectic is almost as old as philosophy itself. It was conceived and born in the fifth century before the Christian era by Zeno the Eleatic. After a brief hundred-year adolescence under the tutelage of the Sophists, who, like intellectual Fagins, exploited it, and of Plato, who inflated its importance, Dialectic reached maturity under Aristotle. It was Aristotle who crystallized its method and gave the art its first scientific treatment; and in his hands it achieved its true personality, with a form and utility of its own; not as an isolated sphere of knowledge, but as part of the Stagyrite's magnificent system of Logic. This fact gives us an essential insight into the nature of Dialectic which is often overlooked. For whatever else in the history of thought its name has been borrowed

to designate, Dialectic was established as a logical art by its greatest master.

We must admit at the outset that the next few pages, for a large part, will be devoted to a kind of scholastic *post mortem.* But Dialectic cannot retain meaning or integrity if set apart from the work it was originally created to accomplish. It must be seen in its total context, within the framework of those habits that rule the Never-Never Land of *ens rationis.* Our first step, then, will be to dissect the art of Logic. From this short study in mental anatomy, Dialectic's function in the whole of intellectual endeavor should take on some degree of clarity.

Despite its frightening name, "intellectual endeavor" is basically like any of our other activities. Charter members in the cosmic family of *ens mobile,* no matter what we busy ourselves about, somewhere along the way we will be involved in a transition from potency to act, from the undetermined to the determinate. In other words, intellectual endeavor is a motion. What marks this motion of intellect is its very enormity. Its terms hover on the rim of infinity itself: the boundless thirst and capacity of the mind on one side, and the timeless infinitude of truth on the other. The movement toward the achievement of truth is a movement of search, a search which is the unique vital labor of man. This is the *motus inquisitivus,* the voracious grasping of the mind at intelligible reality. Bit by bit, the mind is brought into conformity with the vast order of that reality; and little by little, motion subsides. It is the repose of contemplation.

This conformity is effected by judgments. It is by means of the act of judgment that truth is grasped. For if truth is the conformity of mind and thing, then to know this conformity is to know truth; but not by clinging to the simple apprehension of a meaning. Only when the mind makes its judgment that a thing in reality corresponds to the form apprehended is human truth first known and articulated. This is why the act of judgment is described as one of composing and dividing: some form (signified by the predicate) is applied to, or removed from, the thing (signified by the subject).

A barber could conceivably get his job done by taking each hair and snapping it at the proper length. But the use of clippers makes the work easier, faster, and less prone to error. It is the same in the realm of the rational: right tools assure a better product. Here we see the precise function, in the Aristotelian concept, of logical arts. The whole of Logic is structured to bring about the valid wedlock of S and P, to help effect and form new judgments. Because it is in judgment that truth is had, the logical arts of their very nature become the tools of truth, the *organon* of the philosopher.

Besides the pure demonstrative logic which ordinarily forms the first phase of a scientific curriculum, Aristotle has left us the blueprints of three other main instruments that combine with the demonstrative to con-

stitute the generic *scientia rationalis* or Science of Reasoning. This multiplication of logical arts is not the fruit of some whim on the part of the Philosopher. He realized better than anyone that the frozen formalities of Logic are not a source of speculative delights. But he also saw a real need for each art, recognizing that it is only with the mastery of all four that human nature can be outfitted completely for its trek into the jungles of knowledge. The *motus inquisitivus* is a search demanding the instinct of a hunter so keen as to reduce Nimrod to the stature of a small boy throwing stones. And a hunter is one who *hunts*. His art cannot be confined to the kill alone. He uses instead an aggregate of many arts, some concerned with remote readiness, some with search itself, but all directed to the final moment when the arrow strikes home.

Human nature being what it is, certain truth is not usually captured in one easy sweep. We fumble for a while before we can grasp it, juggling two or three possibilities, sometimes letting the whole thing slip through our fingers. Often the only knowledge possible about a subject consists entirely in juggling it with something else, never taking a firm hold on anything. This is the process of conjecture, the domain of probability. Conjecture is our way of stalking the truth, and the arts that govern it are aptly titled *logica inventiva,* the Logic of Search and Discovery.

Within the hierarchy of the liberal arts, the habits which make up *logica inventiva* stand in relation to *judicativa,* the Logic of Demonstration, as potential parts to a cardinal virtue. All these arts share the same general labor of guiding reason in its discursive movements (*inducere ex uno in aliud*), but whereas demonstration attains the perfection of truth in scientific certitude (i.e., necessary judgments; hence, *judicativa*), *inventiva* produces conjectural and provisory conclusions. But such conclusions can point the mind in the direction of truth, and so are dispositive to certitude. In the light of this ultimate achievement, *inventiva* is thus the Logic of Discovery, guiding and stimulating search; and equally the Logic of Disposition, providing the rough sketches and patterns of color for the final portrait of reality.

But there is a more immediate sense in which the name *inventiva* is especially fitting. Not only does the *inventio* here extend solely to the end of searching, but to the discovery of the very means of searching. It is just as if we wanted to hunt dinosaurs. Granted we knew how to go about finding a live dinosaur nowadays, we would still have the problem of discovering some way to shoot the thing without blowing it up completely. We might invent some new kind of weapon, or a novel variation of an old one; for instance, a jumbo sling-shot. This problem of the invention of means is that which confronts the conjectural logician. It is the problem of finding the *medium probativum.*

Without a *medium probativum,* Logic cannot function. Since the immediate goal of Logic is a judgment or conclusion, the keystone of any

logical art will be its construction of arguments, the bridges over which the mind is conducted from one judgment to another. It is the medium which founds the consequence in an argument, acting as a sort of cantilever to support one truth on another: one thing follows from something else because they are somehow mutually connected in a common middle. In other words, the medium causes the conclusion. Logic lays down the rules of manipulating these causes to produce the desired effect.

In demonstration, the medium is a proper principle of the thing known; one of its reasons, causes, or elements. This is why knowledge through demonstration corresponds exactly to reality: what causes the thing itself in reality also causes our knowledge of the thing.

Obviously, if every subject admitted of strict demonstration, all arguments would take on the perfection of that form. But this world is not an intellectual Eden. Many of the things we know are beyond the scope of any science. Far from being rooted in the solid soil of evident first principles, they grow in a bed of shifting quicksand. This is the treacherous garden of contingency. Any knowledge falling short of perfection involves something contingent, something with a bad case of *aliter se habere*; and so the process of reaping conclusions in these gloomy precincts cannot involve proper principles or necessary causes, because the contingent as such has no necessity. There are simply no such principles to be had. This follows from the nature of conjecture itself, whose characteristic note is that it lacks the *propria* of scientific vision. Conjecture and contingent always go hand in hand.

A thing can be called contingent on two counts. If it is contingent in itself, *in essendo,* then its very being is uncertain, unstable. Since it is the being of a thing which causes truth in the mind, the stability of certitude is here impossible. The mind, knowing the contingent, is itself contingent; its judgment could be otherwise.

Aside from intrinsic uncertainty in the matter, contingency may stem from another source. We must keep in mind the fact that logical arts are essentially *ad alterum.* They are to be used in the acquisition of truth, which is not the labor of one or two, but a social endeavor of all human nature. And within society we perennially find two main groups: those who teach, and those who learn. It is the disciple, not the master, who acquires truth; the master presumably has it already. Logic, therefore, is for the learner; and the subject under consideration must be taken up with a view to the dispositions of the learner or audience. For even if there is no contingency in the truth to be argued, the audience itself may be glossed over with a slippery coat of indispositions to which no discourse can cling firmly. Evidence means nothing when the jury-box is on fire. The matter is contingent *in cognoscendo,* whether or not it is such *in essendo.* The state of mind is the same whatever the source of contingency; the arguments are seen in the same half-light of incertitude. With matter

contingent in itself, neither subject nor audience admits certainty; or, if the mind fails to see that necessary truth is really necessary, due to some indisposition to evidence, then it is *apparently* contingent and again the intellect is in no mood for demonstration. The subject cannot be resolved into pure meaning, and thus cannot be dealt with scientifically. It must be known in some other way.

This "other way" is the area of *inventiva.* The Logic of Demonstration, working in perfect matter which obligingly hands over its own necessary causes as media, can achieve perfection. But the contingent is a miser who buries his *propria,* defying us to penetrate the opaque wall of his unprincipled existence; and perfection, at least here and now, cannot be had. Demonstrative logic, however, is powerless without a demonstrative medium. We need other arts to overcome the added difficulty of arguing despite contingency. This is the task of *inventiva,* which is designed to work in faulty materials, producing what contingency will allow. If perfection is impossible, we do the best we can. Herein lies the problem of the medium in conjectural logic. The logician must construct arguments in uncertain matter with media which are not the causes of things, which are not responsible for the essential being of what is known. But on the other hand, if they are to be media at all, they must in some way be able to cause our knowledge, even if they do not cause the thing. There could be no argument otherwise. The logician is forced to find or invent some other kind of valid middle term; but what kind?

When the hunter is tracking down his quarry, he tries to discover traces or signs that will lead him to game. This is exactly what the mind does in the Logic of Discovery. It looks for indications, pointers, things that can hint to us about the truth of something else. We said that the logician needs a medium which somehow causes knowledge of a subject, but which is not necessarily the cause of that subject; and this is what we ordinarily mean when we talk about *signs* in the intellectual order. For example, wrapping a child in swaddling clothes and laying him in a manger is not the cause of his being a Savior, although it may be a cause of our knowing him as such. It is a sign unto us.

Signs are a kind of guide. They are exterior to the thing, but have some affinity or connexion to it so as to indicate what may be the heart of the matter. However, since every effect only resembles its cause, the conclusions caused by signs will also be in some way exterior to the truth of things, and leave us still on the outside looking in. Such knowledge can at best be only probable. But any knowledge, no matter how uncertain, is better than none at all. In the process of conjecture we cast about for anything that can shed light on the problem; if not enough to illumine the truth fully, at least some faint glimmer to point up the gross outlines until something better appears. And in some happy instances, signs may lead us directly to the misers treasure-trove of principles; often the momentary flare of a match is just sufficient to get the key into the lock.

Here we see the essential order of the Logic of Discovery to the Logic of Demonstration; for *inventio* through signs, whether or not it appears that what we have found is the real answer to a problem, never carries with it the cessation of all doubt. There remains a ghostly question-mark behind every conclusion that comes through signs. The erasure of that question-mark is the proper work of demonstration, when and if this is possible. Demonstration is nothing more than linking up something found to something certain, an evident principle, in order that the discovery itself may participate that certitude. Demonstrative argument is primarily an instrument of verification; inventive argument is one of inquisition.

At this point, having envisaged *inventiva* as the sign-logic of the contingent, we pick up our scalpel again. If we examine the kinds of contingent knowledge which can come about through argument, it is possible to pick out distinct types of signs required as media for each. And this will in turn specify the various branches of conjectural logic, which are nothing more than determined methods or faculties of arguing with signs. Corresponding to each basic genus or use of signs there is a special part of *inventiva*; it all comes out quite neatly.

Fundamentally, contingent knowledge is either singular or universal. If singular, then it is had through a sign which is equally singular, something necessarily sensible and concrete. This type of sign admits of two different uses in argument. If it is used as a medium in the strict sense, as part of a discursive proof, it leads to a probable judgment about some singular fact. This is called *suspicion*, which ordinarily pertains to the practical order, the realm of moral action. The singular contingent *qua* singular, as it exists in itself, is a complete blank to the speculative intellect. We only conjecture about it intellectually as it relates to our actions: something we are going to do to it, or intend to do about it. In an election, for example, when we weigh the merits of one candidate against those of another, it is not to determine the unique individual nature of this or that Man of the People, but only how we are going to vote. The logician here strives, by utilizing something sensible as evidence, to make the audience respond to a concrete good; to engender what is known as the "practical syllogism" in the prudential act of counsel. Through his arrangement of singular indications, he applies some general moral conviction to a particular case. The role of constructing and exhibiting such proofs belongs to that part of *inventiva* familiarly termed Rhetoric, the Logic of Persuasion.

Again, sometimes a sign or composition of signs is not simply part of an argument, but is used as the whole argument itself. Rather than reason to a conclusion through a sensible medium, we only represent the conclusion as frozen in a single instance. The sign here is a medium not so much in the discursive sense, but inasmuch as it becomes the bridge between mind and truth. It is an image in which the truth may be contemplated, not in the abstract, but in a vivid, striking singular. Such an

image necessarily involves two requirements: discriminating choice, and arrangement of parts. Every element in the image must be fittingly significant; and the whole must be ordered in a way that will hold our attention, giving some intimation that truth is around the corner. This means that the sign-image must have beauty. When there is no discursive movement, and the object is a singular contingent, only the delight born of beauty can capture the mind. This captivating imitation of truth in beauty evokes a quasi-contemplative state of mind, an affective tasting of truth, an *existimatio* generally referred to as *appreciation* or the *poetic response.* The art which oversees the making of signs like this, the selection and ordering of its elements, is that of Poetics, the Logic of Creation. In poetic argument is realized the full import of our *inventio:* not only is the medium discovered, but it is a complete fiction of the art itself.

So far we have established, within the gamut of probability that stretches between science and absolute doubt, the two states of poetic captivation and moral suspicion. The corresponding judgments are both singular, each concerned in its own way with the sensible-contingent. These have the common property of any contingent judgment in that the connexion of S and P is not necessary; and the assent of the intellect is given always with the fear that things could be otherwise, that the opposite might be true. But even in the order of contingency, captivation and suspicion are relatively weak and imperfect, because the end result of rhetorical and poetic argument is never an assent *in universo.* While the intellect may, because of some light sign, momentarily incline more to one view than to another, the conclusion is not taken in a universal sense; it is accepted as having probability only in this or that set of concrete circumstances. We read, for example, of Saint Peter explaining to the crowds at Jerusalem what had happened to the disciples when they received Holy Spirit: "These men are not drunk, as you imagine, since it is only nine o'clock in the morning." (Acts 2, 15) This is an excellent instance of rhetorical enthymeme, which utilizes a sensible sign as evidence. But its conclusion cannot apply universally. The argument is convincing only here and now, at nine o'clock; just as it would be ridiculous to try and prove that a man is sober at sundown simply because he was not drunk at nine this morning. The assent to a poetic argument is equally singular, and, in fact, even less vigorous, coming as it does not from any actual proof, but through the influence of a fictional representation.

Does this mean that there is a gap in our continuum of contingency? Perhaps we have discovered an intellectual No Man's Land between the unyielding totality of scientific certitude and the *ut nunc* probability of individual moral decisions. Or is there another assent which accepts contingent statements universally?

Experience tells us that such a state of mind does exist, because we manifest it every time we are called upon to voice an *opinion.* The word "opinion" can refer in general to the acceptance of any proposition which

is not necessary; but in the strict sense, opinion is a judgment that straddles the fence between science and suspicion, because it is both universal and uncertain. It is contingent knowledge, like suspicion, and only probable. But instead of the sensible-contingent, opinion has for its object the intelligible-contingent: something in the speculative environment which, under existing conditions, cannot be tied down to any scientific principles. As far as we know, it has no principles. Although lack of principles limits us to conjecture, it does not hinder the object from remaining universal; for if the mind gives an assent which is total, the statement must be taken as applicable to all possible instances, not merely one or two. Thus when Saint Peter argued that his companions were not drunk, he produced only a suspicion regarding that particular group. But suppose he had gone further, and tried to prove, say, that it is impossible to be drunk at nine in the morning. His argument, in its essence, would have had to leave individuals and concrete circumstances behind; and what he would have tried to establish would be the universal probability of *opinion.*

What kind of an argument could Saint Peter have used? Neither Rhetoric or Poetics, with their singular signs, can conclude universally; demonstration would have been out of the question. The answer seems evident. If we eliminate the arts of Demonstration, Rhetoric, and Poetic, there is only one other possibility. We need only one more basic art: a Logic whose function it is to produce, direct, and elaborate speculative opinion. This is the last part of *inventiva,* and, as we shall see, demonstrative logic's closest cousin. This is Dialectic.

In order to ground the total assent of opinion, the medium of dialectical argument must be at least as universal as the conclusion. Such a requirement delights the logician no end, because it means that his proofs can be constructed one step nearer to perfection. It is true enough that arguments about the intelligible-contingent have no material necessity; but with a truly universal medium, the way is open for one statement to follow from another by a necessity of form. And when there exists a necessary consequence, we have a syllogism. By definition, syllogism is an argument in which the connexion of S and P in the conclusion is necessarily inferred from their mutual connexion with the medium in the premisses. This genial embrace can come about only if the medium is somehow universal, which it must be if it is to found opinion. We should emphasize, however, that it is the *consequence* which is necessary, and not the *consequent* or conclusion. In dialectical syllogism, the consequent remains contingent and only probable, i. e., opinionative.

By the syllogism *simpliciter* is not sufficient to distinguish Dialectic from Logic of Demonstration, although it does set it apart from the non-syllogistic arts of Rhetoric and Poetics. Considered simply as form, syllogism is a single species; and from this viewpoint, the basic arguments of Dialectic and Demonstration are identical. The syllogistic form *infers;*

it does not *prove*. What establishes the argument as a particular kind of proof, then, will not be the form of reasoning, but rather the material character of its premises. Dialectical syllogism is a product of *logica inventiva*, tentative and conjectural, and it differs from demonstration because its medium of proof is radically different: not a real principle, but a sign. Thus its distinctive character stems from the premises, because it is within the premises of a dialectical syllogism that the sign-medium is portioned out to S and P.

How does the dialectician put sign and syllogism together to engender an opinion? And what sort of sign does he use? If we take as our fundamental axiom the fact that medium causes conclusion, and apply it to the exigencies of opinion, then a dialectical sign, in general, will be anything which can be predicated universally, and with probability, of both S and P. Since the conclusion follows the weaker part, at least one of the premises must involve a merely probable predication, a contingent judgment; and in order to have syllogism, the medium must be sufficiently universal so as to apply to both extremes. In most cases, both premises consist in probable predications. For instance, a dialectical proof for the immortality of the soul might be built on these two probabilities: "All men honor their ancestors; but no one in his right mind shows honor to someone or something that does not exist." We then point to the evident fact that the body corrupts after death, and no longer exists. Hence the reason why men honor those who have died must be that their souls do not corrupt with the body, but continue to live on despite their state of separation; therefore, the soul must be immortal.

At this stage the wary reader may have an uncanny sensation of making the second turn on that mental merry-go-round known as the Vicious Circle. The conclusion of dialectical argument is, obviously, an opinion. We have just now stated that the premises of this argument are universal contingent predications, which is only another way of saying that *they* are opinions. So we have opinion coming from opinion, an unsteady motion launched from a point unfixed; we seem to be doing pushups in a pool of quicksand, with each effort sinking us deeper and deeper into the mire of contingency. Nevertheless, this is precisely what the dialectician does: he builds one opinion on another, and it is no more a vicious circle than the demonstration which builds truth on truth. As we shall see, opinionative reasoning, instead of driving us farther down into the depths of uncertainty, can act as a path to scientific certitude.

It is the nature of opinion to be a sign of truth in its own right, whether it is assumed as premise or inferred as conclusion. The connexion of S and P in a probable statement is not intrinsically necessary, and therefore is not necessarily true. It becomes an opinion when the mind assents to this contingent connexion and accepts the statement as having probability. Thus the dialectical syllogism, in general, is one which concludes from probable premises, i. e., contingent statements accepted by everyone, or

by the majority, or by the experts. But the thing that makes a proposition probable and serves as a foundation for general assent is a property we might call, for lack of a better term, *intellectual verisimilitude.* A probable statement is one which has the *appearance* of truth, and in which the arrangement of terms seems to be in accord with reality.

The rhetorician presents his conclusion as good; the demonstrator, as true; the poet, as beautiful. The mark of a dialectician, on the other hand, is that his entire skill is concentrated on the establishment of verisimilitude as a property of premise and consequent. His sole intent is to present a conclusion, not as good or beautiful or true, but as *true-seeming.* In themselves, dialectical arguments are neither true nor false; they are good or bad, insofar as they produce statements which are like or unlike true and certain judgments.

If one statement is made to flow from others already accepted, then it participates their recognized probability and becomes, like them, an opinion. But audiences are fickle, and the things they will accept may change from moment to moment. The collective mind of any given group is usually a shifting kaleidoscope of opinions, and their subjective assent to one or another cannot stand as the ultimate resolution of dialectical argument. The dialectician's world would be quite rosy if all his premises were immediately accepted; but probability, quite literally, must be seen to be believed. Suppose it is not seen; the premise is not accepted. Or suppose that there exist no opinions previous to the conclusion to serve as premises. Is the dialectician simply left resting on his *medium probativum*? Evidently, this is not the case. The end of Dialectic, for which the art is designed, is the production of opinion, any opinion, and not merely those that can be wrung from present prejudices. It must be able to establish the verisimilitude on which subjective acceptance is based; and for such a task it must have a more objective criterion. That criterion is the ultimate medium of dialectical procedure, the fundamental reason why a statement is acceptable and true-seeming. It is the answer to the question: what are the first principles of Dialectic?

The domain of the probable covers the entire span of being. This is obvious from the fact that we can have an opinion about anything that is. *De facto,* the dialectician can argue about any subject and usually does. In the *Metaphysics,* Aristotle makes the rather startling statement that Dialectic and first philosophy are coextensive and concerned with the same genus: being.[1] But evidently Dialectic is not Metaphysics, because it must inquire about the things which philosophy knows, and it is tentative where philosophy is final. Both likeness and disparity stem from the fact that this identity of genus is only material: they have the same material subject, but differ formally.

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[1] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (ed. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle;* New York: Random House, 1941), IV, 2, 1004 b 17-26.

If the dialectician is able to construct arguments on any theme or problem, it must be that he employs principles common to all things, which can only be principles of being. Note that he does not demonstrate, because these common principles, in his hands, do not generate certitude. This, on the other hand, is the role of Metaphysics, which does demonstrate with "common principles" because its proper consideration is *circa ipsas res communes*; and thus common principles in metaphysics are proper, true, and necessary in application. But whereas the metaphysician considers all being in its ontological sense, the logician's world is that of *logical* being. These are things made by the mind, and are not found in the real world. The being of reason, however, has its own proper principles, just as real being; and Dialectic, in its doctrinal function (*docens*), studies this kind of being through those principles. In its institution of the modes of logical procedure it can function as a demonstrative science, utilizing the proper principles of its formal subject.

Considered in its executive function (*utens*), as actually constructing arguments, it defects from the mode of science, because the conclusions are only probable; the arguments proceed from opinion and end in opinion. But if the ultimate media, those which are primarily responsible for verisimilitude, are not the proper principles of the thing known, they do not come from that thing and must be extrinsic to it. We have just seen, moreover, that Dialectic's "thing known" includes the whole of intelligible being. It looks as if the dialectician might turn out to be an intellectual Mother Hubbard. What principles does he have left in the larder which are both applicable to every subject of opinion, and at the same time extraneous to the whole of *ens naturae*? These can only be the principles of his own art, the principles of logical being itself.

The logician considers, not the existing of things, but the manner of attributing predicates to them. Thus, if a statement has no intrinsic necessity, no internal bond of connexion between S and P, an *extrinsic* connexion can be had if it follows the rules set down by Logic for the various relations of predication. In attacking a problem, the dialectician first determines the mode of predicating involved, and then applies the laws of that mode to see whether or not a given term is actually a predicate of the subject. For example, the question: "Is it true that man is an animal?" is a problem of genus. Notice, however, that the problem is not whether the term "animal" is a genus; its status as a type of predicable in the first act of the mind is not in question. What the dialectician wants to establish (or destroy) is the conclusion that "animal" *is actually predicated* as the genus of "man". And he does this by testing "animal" according to the requirements of generic predication: to see whether it is said of all men, whether it is in the same predicament as "man", whether it is said of other things than men.

This procedure is valid because logical being, such as the relations of genus, accident, property, or definition, is equivalated to real being.

Entia rationis are conceived after the manner of real being, and in Logic are such relations as are constructed by the mind between real beings as known. Since every real being falls under the consideration of reason, the subject of Logic extends itself to everything of which *ens naturae* is predicated. Thus there exists an affinity between the logical relations of predication, and anything of which it can be said that it *is*, and is in the real world.

When a syllogistic premise is said to be a proper principle, it can mean either that it is not extrinsic, or that it is not common; because each factor precludes the possibility of demonstration. The principles of logical being, as applied to *ens naturae*, are both extrinsic and common: extrinsic, since they deal, not with the *modus rei*, but with the *modus intelligendi*; and common, since they are universally applicable and not proper to any one category. Therefore, although the application of such principles is valid, it is only probable.[2] It is these two properties of removal from real being, and valid but probable application to real being, which make the principles of Logic not only media of Dialectic, but also its ultimate signs.

The real source of probable premises for the dialectician is the logical *rapport* which exists between concepts, the examination of which can establish an extrinsic connexion between S and P that resembles the intrinsic bond of predication in true and necessary propositions. It is the way we ordinarily predicate one thing truly of another. This is the wellspring of verisimilitude for every opinion, whether it is used directly as a proof, or merely to establish a premise. The mind, in dialectical argument, actually *forms* its own premises by establishing a relation of reason between the two terms. This is why the dialectician asks questions; not only about the conclusion, as the demonstrator also does, but about the premises as well. His premise depends on the adversary's choice of one arm of a contradiction, because the opposite may always be true, and a probability must be accepted before it becomes an opinion. Thus, through a process of questioning, the dialectician can make the audience choose, form, and accept a premise.

The art of questioning and answering, called Peirastic, is also based on the principles of predication. It consists in an inquisitive and explicit application of logical criteria to one of the premises. Suppose that Socrates has just concluded that man probably has free will because he is punished for wrongdoing, and therefore must have some kind of free responsibility over his actions. Protagoras, a member of the audience, is not convinced. Their conversation might begin as follows:

S. . . . and so, just as we do not punish the stone that injures our foot because it had nothing to say about the matter, we must punish men because they have freedom, and could have done otherwise.

[2] Cf. St. Thomas, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum* Aristotelis Expositio (Turin: Marietti, 1950), IV, 4, nn. 572-577.

P. Oh, come now, Socrates. You really can't mean that.

S. Oh there, Protagoras, my Sophist friend. Do you see a difficulty in my reasoning?

P. Perhaps. But answer one question first: would you consider beating a good punishment?

S. Unquestionably. It is eminently suited to some criminal temperaments.

P. Then you would say that the criminal is beaten because he is free?

S. My point exactly.

P. Ah. But just the other day did I not observe you whipping your dog because of some mischief he had got into?

S. Your vision waxes keener from day to day, Protagoras. You did.

P. But if you were beating the poor whelp, then you were punishing him, according to your previous statement. And everyone knows that dogs are dumb animals; when they bite you, they think you are a piece of meat. They have no malice. Are you, then, giving freedom to the dog, or denying it of men? Either conclusion plainly destroys your position.

S. A good point, my friend. But I think that on closer examination of the facts, you would see that . . .

The discussion here hinges on the problem of whether or not "freedom" can be predicated as a property of "man". Protagoras is attempting to show that the predicate does not seem to apply exclusively to this subject, but also to others; because the logical notion of a property requires that the given predicate have sole application to one specific subject. Since his objection is to the use of "punishment" as a sign-medium, Socrates is about to distinguish the different senses in which "to be punished" is predicated of "man" and "dog".

But this art of questioning and answering is not essential to the office of the dialectician, who is concerned primarily with proofs. It is, however, annexed to Dialectic as a handmaid. The same can be said of refutative logic, Sophistics, which treats of fallacies in argument. A demonstration, theoretically, has no need of being defended. But a dialectical proof has no intrinsic necessity beyond the syllogistic consequence, thereby providing a basis for attack and a need for a defensive art of refutation. The objector attempts to prove that not only *could* some statement be otherwise, but actually *is* otherwise.

As we have seen, the proximate end of Dialectic is the genesis of opinion. But of what use is an elaboration of mere opinion? What good is a faculty of probable reasoning? Considered only as a logical discipline, *docens*, Dialectic has the obvious general utility of any part of Logic: an ability to do that which we choose with the materials available; a fa-

cility in argumentation, defense, and inquiry. It teaches us the method of laying the groundwork for an investigation, and of pursuing the problem to a tentative resolution. In its executive function, *utens*, the art has a twofold utility, according to the subject-matter in which it argues. Concerning points which do not admit of certitude, the contingent *in se*, there often arise casual disputes; here Dialectic is invaluable, because it helps us to meet people on the grounds of their own convictions, and to refute anything which seems to be stated unsoundly.

But in matter which is only probable *quoad nos*, Dialectic has a further utility in relation to the various sciences. Whereas discussions about probabilities *in se* are patently logical and do not attempt to go beyond the realm of opinion, every statement which is contingent *quoad nos* can be regarded as the material object of some science, potentially a formal object. However, as matters stand, there cannot be found a medium by which the statement could be attached to certain and evident principles. As conclusion, it is illumined instead by the logician's second intentions; and it is held, not as a formal conclusion of a science, but as formally pertaining to the habit of Logic and materially to science.

A speculative opinion, considered ontologically, is a quality; and as such it forms a proximate material disposition to scientific knowledge, bringing the intellect close on the heels of proper principles. Like the rhetorician, the dialectician can argue on both sides of a problem, and in either camp of contradiction. Since this is possible in matter contingent *quoad nos*, because of the unstable connexion of S and P, it is no insult to the truth. It has, in fact, for its purpose a choice of the conclusion which seems farthest removed from error and is most like the manner of predication in true and certain statements. When the evidence is insufficient, the will must move the intellect to accept a statement; under the guidance of logical laws, we *choose* that arm of a contradiction closest to the truth, the *bonum intellectus* which is desired by the will. We adhere to the conclusion because we will to do so. From a negative standpoint, the best verisimilitude is the least of a number of intellectual evils.

But once a dialectical conclusion has been established, after having chosen the more probable from either side of the case, the mind can seek the proper scientific medium with which to resolve that opinion into the certitude of science. If the principles exist, then the mind is in proximate potency to grasp them; if, under the circumstances, there are none, we have at least opinion where before there was doubt. Thus probable arguments prepare the way for demonstration; but until such is achieved, the mind must be content to rest, not in the term of its search, but in the search itself. Without proper causes, reasons, or elements, the intellect is not yet determined *ad unum*, and there is still room for the opposite to elbow its way in. The body of knowledge engendered by dialectical methods is not only opinionative, but as we mentioned above, it also remains *logical*,

pertaining to the habit of Logic as to the source of its principles. It belongs to the sciences only materially, either as potential conclusion (for instance, a hypothetical theory or construct), or as material disposition to knowledge of their proper principles.

Since that which is first in a science cannot be deduced from anything previously certain, the discussion of first principles is most appropriate and proper to Dialectic. In original presentation and later defense, only the dialectician, proceeding from probabilities generally accepted, is able to argue to first principles. Although he cannot establish their certitude, he can show them to be the most reasonable starting point of demonstration. Perhaps the most outstanding example of this function of Dialectic is found in the works of Aristotle himself. At the beginning of his revolutionary treatment of natural science, he spends the entire first two books of the *Physics* in a dialectical criticism of other philosophers' opinions, and an exposition along the same lines of his own views on the principles of physical change.[3]

In general, these are the notions included in an over-all picture of Dialectic. Now let us put them together. Dialectic is a part of *logica inventiva*, a faculty of reasoning through signs as media. These signs are not sensible, but intelligible, the principles of logical being, which the dialectician uses to paint the image of truth in contingent statements. A real definition could be formulated as follows: *Dialectic is that logical art which establishes scientifically the laws of probable premise and syllogism, and which applies those same laws in every domain by drawing probable conclusions about real subjects from premises which, under their aegis, have been formed by the mind and accepted by the audience; for the purpose of attaining the best knowledge possible in matters which are the proper objects of opinion, and of proposing a path of logical criticism to the principles of science.* All this says, of course, is that Dialectic is the art of probable reasoning.

What has been written here is intended simply to state what Dialectic is, and what it does, and why. A treatise on the art itself, such as the *Topics* of Aristotle, would tell us how we are to go about doing it. But perhaps we have given some indication of the premise nature of dialectical procedure, particularly in its essential order to scientific certitude. The rigor of judgment must follow the liberty of invention; if we are true to our own nature, we must not be satisfied by opinion in matters which can eventually be made to yield the clarity of truth. Dialectic must be seen and used in its proper perspective, as the road to discovery, and not a steppingstone to the easy comfort of obscurity and vagueness. Our nature tends to the truth; the dialectician must be on his guard lest he

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[3] Aristotle, *Physics* (ed. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle;* New York: Random House, 1941), 184 a 9-200 b 11.

merit the opprobrium of Ecclesiastes: "God made man right, and he hath entangled himself in an infinity of questions."[4] He should, rather, follow in the steps of that wise man, who was able to say: "I have surveyed all things with my mind, to know, and consider, and seek out wisdom and reason."[5]

Cyril Dwiggins, O.P.

[4] Ecclesiastes 7, 30.
[5] *Ibid.*, 26.

SERVANT OF TRUTH

THE TRUE, THE JUST AND THE GOOD have within them hidden forces of strength and vitality, but for want of proper spokesmen they are seldom heard of. This fact is cited by Aristotle as the first and essential reason for the study of Rhetoric. If it seems unusual to trust such priceless commodities to the hands of Rhetoric, it is only because the same odium rests upon that study in our times as it did in the days of Aristotle. Our wish is to expose the true nature of Rhetoric as a liberal art, an art whose sole reason for being rests in its service to those branches of knowledge which men have ever considered a perfection to know and teach. To present Rhetoric in such a role is to silence most of those whose attacks betray their false view of the art as having a matter or content of its own. As for those who protest the great harm possible from the unjust use of Rhetoric, we answer with Aristotle's own brevity when he observed that this is a charge which can be laid at the door of any great or useful thing except virtue, which alone guarantees its own right use.

We must say many things about the nature of an intellectual habit before it emerges from the mists of description with any clarity. The process required is one of comparison and precision with a view to revealing the differences which guarantee Rhetoric the privilege of separate existence. The family of habits from which Rhetoric springs is a unique household in the community of human knowledge. The head of this family is strict demonstrative logic, an architectonic science and criterion of the less perfect disciplines annexed to it. Rhetoric receives from strict logic its irrevocable commitment to the pursuit of truth. For the majority of men, this pursuit is not carried on in the rarified atmosphere of scientific proof, but rather in the broad field of less compelling truths, generally classed as Dialectics. In its exploration of the possible avenues of truth, Dialectics is both tireless and unendingly inventive, counting no means, if true, as alien to its endeavor. This is the Logic of Search.

Before distinguishing this class into formal Dialectic, Rhetoric and Poetics, we must make clear the note common to all three—the setting in motion of minds somehow initially indisposed for the quest of truth.

Where the obstacle is speculative, formal Dialectic rules. On the other hand, where the appetites must be employed to clear the way, we need a logic of affections, further distinguished into Rhetoric which merely raises the emotions, and Poetics which both raises and sublimates them.

All these members of the family of logical habits cooperate in obtaining a contemplation of the highest truth, flowing one into the other to form an argument of invincible force. The listener is first refreshed with an intuition of the truth in the beauty of the poetic mode. This argument remains at the frontier of consciousness as rhetoric highlights its goodness and initiates a discursive attention which overshadows the poetic image. The restless activity of dialectics creates a hunger for certitude which is finally satisfied by demonstration through scientific logic. At the end, the poetic image and scientific judgment merge as the mind rests in a contemplative gaze on truth.

The idea of Rhetoric should have taken on some clarity of form in the course of this discussion. A part of dispositive, not demonstrative logic, Rhetoric is concerned not with speculative truths as is Formal Dialectics, but with practical truths. It moves the mind, not directly, but by way of the appetites, whose dynamism it employs to fortify light probability. We may define Rhetoric as *the habit by which we observe, in any given case, the available means of persuasion.*

This is a function which Rhetoric shares with no other art; one which dictates its concern with practical truths. The persuasion mentioned in the definition is one effected by rational speech, for Rhetoric is the liberal art whose immediate concern is human speech. In persuasion, finally, one heightens the emotions with the clear intention of leaving them on a level of intensity which will directly result in a practical judgment to do some virtuous act. This is to contrast the habit with Poetics, which brings its audience to a rest closer to pure contemplation. In the poetic catharsis, the emotions are strongly exercised by rich imagery and stirring event until, yielding to the exhaustion of satiety, they rest, leaving the mind free to scan the truth with the greatest composure and lucidity.

In its choice of subjects, Rhetoric enjoys a universality equalled only by Dialectics. As is all making, this habit is limited by the materials available; but these materials are so rich and varied that in themselves they present delightfully colorful and interesting features of their own. The form into which these materials are cast—the Means of Persuasion—are themselves the discovery of Rhetoric. They are a kind of elucidation of its own principles. Asserting its family tie to Logic, Rhetoric provides for the manufacture of arguments whose issue must be persuasion—persuasion precisely as it proceeds from the impact of the spoken word. The chief factors considered by the rhetorician narrow to three. His *personal character* is perhaps the most effective means of persuasion at the speaker's disposal. By character we mean the authority with which his person

invests his words. The second factor is *the proof* embodied in the words of the speech—a construct which Rhetoric makes and adapts to each occasion. *The listener* is the third factor, for the speaker must concern himself not only with the objective appeal of truth, but with the subjective condition of the audience as well. This third element not only influences the other two, but also governs the division of Rhetoric. All three factors are used simultaneously, varying in import from one type of rhetoric to another, as will be evident from a detailed treatment of each.

It is only with reference to what is manifested in the speech that the personal character of the speaker is a most effective means of persuasion. Although he tells much by his appearance, it is only by intimate speaking contact with the listener that the unmistakable virtue of the speaker is manifested infallibly. But many virtues are far from evident even after long contact with the person who possesses them. The speaker cannot afford the time for his true inner virtue to grow upon the audience; he must move his hearers now. His virtue, then, must be obvious, forming a kind of argument by signs. The one sign which no audience can fail to recognize in a speaker is greatness of soul.

The person of a speaker clothed with magnanimity is an irresistible argument cast in flesh and blood. Such a one compels persuasion. His stature is proportioned to great deeds; men will follow him, even to death. There are a host of other virtues which might aid the speaker, but none qualify so well as greatness of soul. Liberality and magnificence are of little use, engrossed as they are in material concerns. Temperance is also unsuited to helping the speaker. It, too, is concerned with the material, and it is difficult to manifest to an audience. Prudence and wisdom, on the other hand, are easily recognized in a speaker, but they are notoriously ineffectual in stirring up the emotions. Virtues such as justice and courage are quite suitable; but they are given much greater force when united to magnanimity. We should concentrate, then, on the highlights of this virtue itself, throwing some of its more prominent features into relief.

The principal sign of magnanimity is a deep and imperturbable confidence, completely destructive of fear. Such confidence gives stern proof of many perils successfully undertaken, and radiates a presence that promises defeat for any future menace. Flowing from this confidence is a certain impregnability, the second facet of the virtue of magnanimity. The magnanimous man must repose in certitudes as in an unassailable fort. How can he move the minds and hearts of others unless he be fixed and firm himself? Every external action must reflect his inner confidence and security. The great soul will have a cosmic view of things, a concern for the common weal, noble aspirations, superlative imagery, and an entire set of bodily movements commensurable to his soul. The virtue of magnanimity cannot help but play a vital role in the work of persuasion.

Although the speaker argues by manifesting his person, it is not this argument which places Rhetoric among the logical disciplines. It is rather the argument of persuasion, a proof unique to the speaker, that constitutes the element most completely under his control, for this he fashions by his art. One must at times persuade where demonstration is impossible for the simple reason that there are people whom one cannot instruct, and truths that admit only that degree of certitude called suspicion. In regard to the former, it is common experience that people hold on mere authority truths most certain in themselves. This deficient hold on truth is often made up by custom or by the appetites. In the case of less compelling truths, we take advantage of these external aids to reinforce light probabilities, intensifying their power to effect a suspicion of truth.

It is in such a milieu that rhetoric works best, treating of those matters that men speak of without arts or systems to guide them, and doing this in the presence of those to whom a complex argument is a tangle of impenetrable subtleties. Man focuses most of his deliberations upon his own contingent actions, which in turn make up the materials of rhetorical argument. Probabilities and signs figure largely in the arguments formed from such materials. In a very real sense, the *enthymeme* is the distinctive argument of Rhetoric, and is properly used only by that science. The *example* also finds service in Rhetoric, but it is common to Poetics as well. It may be asserted that the syllogism and induction, found in demonstrative logic, are the only ways to prove anything. This is true, but the enthymeme and example have validity as rhetorical equivalents of these proofs, and actually profit from skill in the strict forms. An enthymeme *may* be considered a modified syllogism.

But the correlation between strict logic and Rhetoric must not be stressed to the point of confusing the essential distinctions between the two. There is simply no syllogism without universality, *dictum de omni et nullo*, and universals are *not* the concern of Rhetoric. It is well to assert again that the reason for this is the incertitude of the matter of the enthymeme. Singular acts have no necessity about them by which one may compel assent. Strictly speaking, then, a Rhetorical enthymeme cannot be defined as a syllogism with one premise left implicit, for these are the parts of an argument whose existence and efficacy are built on universality. The rhetorical enthymeme has no consequence, at least not in the sense of a conclusion caused by the premises, for this would require necessity. For this reason, the "conclusion" of an enthymeme, if it is true, is so only accidentally, for it could always be otherwise.

A parallel situation prevails with regard to the rhetorical example. This argument from example bears an obvious resemblance to the induction which, while formally weak, is nevertheless clear, convincing and readily learned by the senses. The validity of the induction derives from its progress, more or less perfect, through singulars to a universal. The rhetorical example, on the other hand, quite incongruously argues from

a singular to another singular. Here the vividness of the sign gives it a universality which it has not obtained from the enumeration of singulars.

It is because Rhetoric seeks to persuade through the lifting of the emotions, that the enthymeme is its distinctive argument. The antipathy between the intellect and the emotions is such, that to reflect on the passions, even in their most ardent flight, is to bring them to earth, helpless. The enthymeme argues so as to sustain this flight, never throwing down its propositions as obstacles in their course. Thus guided but not checked, the passions can wing to their goal, which is to effect a practical judgment. It is the premise left implicit which permits this freedom. The enthymeme pivots its proof on an opinion fixed within the listener; an opinion which is never questioned or made problematic, lest it impede the emotional progress of the argument. The premise asserted implicitly may be either the conclusion, which in a sophisticated audience is left to the listener to draw, or among the unlettered, who favor having the conclusion stated for them, one of the other premises. An example of the former is the caution, "Nations have fallen under such a policy," whose conclusion is that our nation might reach the same fate. The latter is seen in the advice, "Don't vote for him—he's a liberal," which assumes that liberal candidates are unworthy. So great is the power of such argument, when coupled to emotional appeal, that the listener may be swayed, not only to the conclusion, but to the implicit premise which, being used as a principle, may be accepted uncritically as one.

Selected examples of enthymeme argumentation show that its argument is a persuasive one, taken from common knowledge and opinion. The conclusion is almost always foreseen in some way from the start. A general method is to manipulate the terms, using them in different senses, or defining them in a new way, as to say "A cynic is one who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing." Comparison is a more effective technique, drawing upon the natural movement of the mind to seek similarity in dissimilars. There are superb and abundant examples from the teachings of Christ. Paradox is one type of contrast used to point out the radical departure of the New Law. "He who loves his life shall lose it."[1] When Jesus declared God and money incompatible, He argued from opposites—the man serving two masters "will hate the one and love the other, or he will devote himself to the one and despise the other."[2] Of the two possibilities, both end badly—a strong proof.

Our Lord often persuaded by condemning the childish inconsistencies of the Pharisees, comparing their reception of Himself and of John the Baptist. "When John came, he would neither eat nor drink, and you say, He is possessed. When the Son of Man came, he ate and drank with you, and of him you say, here is a glutton; he loves wine."[3] The proof *a fortiori*

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[1] Jn. 12:25. All New Testament quotations will be taken from the Knox translation.
[2] Luke 16:13.
[3] Luke 7:33-4.

shattered the formalism of Sabbath observance. "If a man receives circumcision on the Sabbath . . . have you any right to be indignant with me for restoring a man's whole strength to him on the Sabbath?"[4] Again, we see this proof in the words directed to Dives in hell. "If they do not listen to Moses and the prophets, they will be unbelieving still, though one should rise from the dead."[5] The use of parallels, correlatives and many other forms of contrast and comparison should be mastered by the rhetorician, who is, above all else, the maker of enthymemes.

The example plays a role subordinate to the enthymeme in the persuasive argument. It is most dramatic and effective when it follows the proof, summarizing it as concretized in a singular sign, or quasi-universal. Historical fact or an illuminating fiction coined by the author are good arguments by example. The former is effective in historical parallels, a device very effective in the hands of Marxists, whose historical dialectic presents a false but very convincing interpretation of the past. Drawing strength from undeniable data in the past, one may parallel Germany's decline with present trends in America, showing in each case how a free people was enslaved thru fear of an external threat. The basis provided for such an argument is that "facts don't lie."

The fictional example brings the rhetorician close to the province of the poet. But the different use is obvious. The poet fashions an entire work around a character who personifies some vice, perhaps paternal imprudence, as in *King Lear*. The speaker, however, will season his speech with many concise illustrations, so obvious and to the point that they may never be relished for their own sake, but only as contributing to the argument. Both similes and narrations serve in this manner. The simile, as used by Rhetoric, is a contrived parallel, often revealing the ridiculous consequence of some action. The short narration, on the other hand, is a kind of illustrative anecdote. The parables of the New Testament, and the Fables of Aesop and La Fontaine are pointed, moralistic stories of this sort, moving the listener's emotions in a direct line to that practical action which is the end of the art.

We have described Rhetoric as persuading men by enforcing emotionally some suspicion of truth, so as to initiate a definite resolve to action. The audience and its emotional makeup must therefore be the object of profound study on the part of the rhetorician. In this sense the emotions are the special study of Rhetoric. Aristotle treats them most formally in this section of his works. The majority of men carry out their everyday affairs and hold their deepest convictions on an emotional basis. To move such men one must give a new direction to the movements of the passions. The emotions, it will be remembered, reverse the cognitive procedure; they project our consciousness outward toward an object as it is in itself, rather than as it exists in the mind. Emotional action, then, consists not in placing

[4] Jn. 7:23.
[5] Luke 17:31.

the object known in the mind of the knower, but in moving the one who desires toward the thing which is desirable. This action is a perfection, for it represents the person seeking some new perfection. The dignity of Rhetoric as an instrument derives from its ability to move men to goals of the most sublime nature.

Persuasion is a perfect ordering of the emotions, not as virtue does this, but by arguments which appeal in the image of goodness and not truth. The rhetorician builds his argument around some good that will lift the listener out of the paralysis of inactivity into a purposive motion to some goal. We have already touched upon the efficacy of the speaker's personal character in disposing the audience emotionally. In general, he must inspire confidence, which he does by manifesting knowledge, greatness of soul, and infinite good will toward his listeners. The arguments of enthymeme and example have been shown to work powerfully on the emotions. Now it is our task to examine what the orator's knowledge of the audience and their emotions should be. He should know these as well as an artist knows his materials, for the orator does not merely make arguments, he actively creates emotional states in his listeners.

It would not be necessary, even should space allow, to treat such of the emotions pertinent to Rhetoric, analyzing each and contrasting it with its opposite. An adequate understanding of the technique may be had by considering one prominent emotion, anger. First we must study the mental state of the angry man, then the causes of his anger, both the persons with whom he becomes angry and the grounds of his anger.

Anger is a painful impulse to take revenge for an evil done to oneself or ones friends. As a rule, men become angry at individuals and not abstract entities. Paradoxically, the emotion is accompanied by pleasure, arising chiefly at the thought of the act of vengeance—a pleasure which may outweigh any painful aspect of the emotion. The grounds for anger are some slight or insult centered on something that we consider of great import. Contempt is one such insult. Insolence has the added refinement of having for its sole purpose the pleasure involved in slighting. Spite is especially goading, for it is a wasteful thwarting of one's desires merely to prevent their fulfilment.

One might question the utility to a speaker of so summary a discussion of anger. Its chief use will lie in knowing how to make people angry, for Rhetoric seeks to move men. An angry man is a moved man, the single thought of vengeance possessing his mind and energies. Rhetoric does not merely initiate the motion; it directs it toward persons with whom one should be angry, providing it with valid motives. Through anger, Shakespeare's Mark Antony worked a remarkable reversal at Caesar's funeral oration. Finally, the art studies how to handle an audience already angry. Poverty and hunger may present the orator with an audience already in motion, seeking redress. His task is to gauge the force and direction of this.

motion and either to calm it or give it a new orientation. One thing is certain, he cannot ignore their anger. This would be to offer insult, a new occasion of anger. For this reason, the emotions must be studied in pairs of opposites, so that having aroused an emotion, the orator can control it in service of the truth he wishes to instill. Only in this way can the emotions be used as means of persuasion.

The method will be the same for all the emotions. For example, fear, shame, pity, envy and their opposites can be studied as emotional states which can be further perfected through the persuasive power of the speaker.

Some mention must be made of the extrinsic factors in the audience which will affect all the emotions. The basic difference between an audience of men and one of women is of immense importance to the speaker. The distinct roles of man and woman in relation to the family are thought by some to be the greatest divergence possible in the same species; no speaker can afford to neglect this consideration when facing an audience made up of either one or both of the sexes.

A man is insulted if his ability as a provider and protector is questioned; a woman, if her capacity to love and nourish her family is doubted. Although few of either sex can follow a scientific argument, men are drawn to what appears to have been proved, while women prefer an intuitive glance. In general, the emotions of women are more unstable than men's, and less controlled. Men are more easily given to anger, while pity predominates among women. Men are proud of their freedom, rationality, and strength, while women, although content to admire men for these qualities, are somewhat sensitive about their subordination to men.

Men and women, then, admire different qualities in a speaker; they are moved by different arguments, and are subject to different emotional responses, all as a result of their radically different roles in family life. Thus a knowledge of the psychological dispositions of the two sexes can become in the hands of the speaker a powerful means of persuasion. The same is true of the differences between youth and age, rich and poor, leader and follower: the rhetorician must know each well, and choose his argument according to the nature of his audience.

We have defined Rhetoric as the habit of observing, in any given case, the available means of persuasion. We have treated in detail each of the means of persuasion separately, in order to clarify the nature and function of each. We considered, in turn, the character of the speaker, his argument, and the audience; and we indicated the role of each in attaining the end of the speaker. But the end or purpose of the speaker may vary. We must now focus our attention on the three kinds of Rhetoric specified by the three distinct ends of persuasion.

The foundation for the division of Rhetoric lies in the various roles that may be played by the audience. Prior to the speech, the audience is the matter which restricts the rhetorician in his choice of forms; during the speech, it is the audience which must be moved. Thus it is the audience which determines the end and object of each kind of persuasion. It is precisely in its role as a kind of judge that the audience provides a basis for the threefold division of Rhetoric. The judgment of the audience may pertain to events in the *future,* in the *past,* or in the *present*; and thus time enters into each classification as a co-determinant with the audience.

This brief description of the basis for the division of Rhetoric makes it possible for us to identify each category in terms consonant with its function. Our problem is to ascribe to each class a name general enough to include any kind of subject matter. When employed by the science of politics, for example, the three classes might be called Legislative, Judicial, and Ceremonial Oratory. The political orator speaks of future laws before the legislative body, treats of past events in the courts, and speaks ceremonially at less formal gatherings. Yet this classification is limited; and it is better to name each type of oratory more generically in terms of the segment of time treated by each: past, present, or future.

To classify Rhetoric according to types, then, is to identify each division by a single characteristic activity, whether it be used in politics, preaching, or as an introduction to some speculative science. The first type, since it deals with future events, may be called the *Oratory of Appeal.* This in the sense that the speaker appeals to the listener to do something in the future. The second may be named the *Oratory of Defense,* insofar as past events, now no longer under man's control, can be the object only of defense or attack. And since praise and blame are the activities characteristic of present affairs, the third type is fittingly called the *Oratory of Praise.* The appropriateness of these terms—Appeal, Defense, and Praise—will be made clear in the following discussion of the three rhetorical forms.

These three categories of Rhetoric are mutually exclusive. Although certain rhetorical methods are common to all three classes, the effectiveness of each type of Rhetoric results from the use of distinct techniques which belong to it exclusively.

Oratory of Appeal, which concerns a future action, combines several techniques to effect its own special argument. It may be defined as that division of Rhetoric which establishes the expedience or harmfulness of a proposed course of action. It does this with the aim of urging the audience either to act, or to refrain from action, in which event it might be called Oratory of Restraint.

Each class of Rhetoric must select a matter on which men can deliberate, matter which depends on their own actions. What is impossible or inevitable, or what is decided by nature or chance, are not fit topics

for persuasive speech. The proper end of Oratory of Appeal is one which men have always associated with the future—with happiness. The argument of appeal will be phrased in terms of the good—not the good in itself, which is no subject of debate, but the good as useful, as a means to happiness. Thus the political speaker will discuss national defense, trade, legislation—the means to the happiness of a perfect state. The preacher will speak of the Sacraments, commandments, counsels, and vows—the means to attain the vision of God. Even if the speaker never explicitly mentions happiness, it is in terms of an eventual happiness that his appeal to the audience must always be made.

In this type of Rhetoric, the personal character of the speaker takes precedence over the other two means of persuasion, over the argument and the audience. The reason for this is that future events are contingent and uncertain, and in these cases the authority of the speaker is crucial.

With regard to style, Rhetoric generally falls short of literary work written specifically to be read. The speaker's style may seem amateurish when compared to the literary piece; it may even contain dramatic devices which are errors in written prose. The literary work, on the other hand, seldom moves an audience when it is delivered as a speech. From style alone, it should be obvious whether a given work has been composed for rhetorical use, or merely to be read.

Of the three classes of Rhetoric, Oratory of Appeal employs the least polished style. In making an appeal, a speaker uses little introduction or narration because his subject matter—the good—does not require these means. Because of the uncertainty of future events. Oratory of Appeal leans more heavily on example than enthymeme. It uses historical example, on the principle that "past is prelude," and that past events may thus serve to persuade the listener to a future pattern of action, or restrain him from some dangerous tendency. Such arguments are relatively weak, and they must be compensated for by the personal force of the speaker, who should assume the characteristics of a leader and counselor in this kind of Rhetoric. The conclusion, in speech of appeal or restraint, is of crucial importance: at just the right moment, when the listener is on the crest of a wave of carefully directed emotion, the conclusion should strike him forcefully and clearly as an exhortation to action.

The second kind of Rhetoric, Oratory of Defense, strives to persuade an audience to judge correctly of past events. Its contrary is accusation. This is less often used, but it operates in the same area of deliberation. This division of Rhetoric may be defined as the one which establishes the justice or injustice of some action by attacking or defending the action in terms of what is right and lawful. Argument figures strongly in defense, since there is a certain necessity and indelibility in past events. Although argument is important in Oratory of Defense, it is the audience that forms the primary means of persuasion in this class of Rhetoric. This is

because the listener is most truly a judge when he deliberates on past events. In accusation and defense, the speaker must take care to lead the audience to a favorable state of mind: it is essential to create the suitable emotional state concerning the deed under dispute, so that the audience may judge the act rightly. A case in point is the courtroom scene, the most typical stage for this type of Rhetoric.

The materials of deliberation in Oratory of Defense reflect the fixed nature of past events. We may illustrate this statement by a contrast. The good moves only in the sense of initiating a motion towards itself, and so has no effect on what has already happened. An event from the archives of the past, on the other hand, is judged according to the most absolute and dispassionate of the virtues, Justice. The act is done; the circumstances and the cloud of emotions which obscured it at the time have vanished. Justice, blindfolded and objective, stands ready to strike with the sword—there seems little room for deliberation. Yet there are two sides to almost every story. The speaker's task, in defense, must be to move the audience to consider the evidence, judge it, and to act upon that judgment.

The subject matter of defense or accusation is some real or imaginary wrong performed in the past. Defense implies attack, and the just man, as such, is never attacked. One important consideration in defense will be the mental state of the wrongdoer, particularly his motivation. When the envious Pharisees accuse Christ of casting out devils by an evil spirit, He argues by proving the lack of motive for such an action. "If it is Satan who casts out Satan, then Satan is at war with himself, and how is his kingdom to stand firm?"[6] An argument such as this is based on the principle that only the insane act without a rational motive.

The objective bases for any accusation or defense are laws and rights. The deliberation of the audience emerges from a fixed center of law, whether natural or divine, civil or ecclesiastical; and often this law serves as the implicit premise in an enthymeme. One law may be pitted against another: Christ argues the New Law against the Old, the spirit of the Scriptures against the tangled web of tradition. He claims jurisdiction over the Sabbath, which the Pharisees guarded jealously as their own. Our Lord reminds them that they often rescue a trapped animal on the Holy Day, and so "there is nothing unlawful . . . in doing a work of mercy on the Sabbath."[7] The crowd gathered in the Temple formed an audience which had to be moved to judge correctly, lest they cut themselves off from the Gospel forever by approving the ways of the Pharisees. It was in this sense that Christ argued by defense and accusation.

The style of speech suited to this class of Rhetoric will be relatively polished, in order to give more immediacy to events of the remote past. The introduction will often be long and well-phrased; its purpose will

[6] Mt. 12:25.
[7] Mt. 12:11.

be to inform the listener on an unfamiliar subject. Narration will also be used, to refresh memories and to present the facts in an order favorable to the argument. The body of the speech will drive home its arguments through carefully constructed enthymemes which pivot on the common assumption that facts do not lie. Witnesses will be used to good effect; Christ, for example, figuratively calls upon the Queen of the South to judge the Pharisees, "for she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon, while a greater than Solomon is here."[8] The conclusion of a defensive oration should summarize the arguments in a compelling way, perhaps by an example, so that the listener will be moved irresistibly to judge the deed as just or unjust.

Oratory of Praise is treated last because it is in a sense the least typical class of Rhetoric. The nature of Oratory of Praise is often misunderstood, perhaps because faulty examples are chosen to illustrate it. It is often conceived as a flowery, effusive kind of speech, more notable for beauty of language and sound of words than for the argument it presents. But Oratory of Praise is properly defined by its end; and its end is to establish, through praise or blame, the fact that a man or an action is honorable or blameworthy. Its subject is present time, and it speaks of virtue or vice, nobility or baseness.

Since the speaker who praises or censures operates in the sphere of the present, with only occasional references to past and future, his listener is only loosely called a judge, for he decides neither the desirability of a future act, nor the justice of a past act. His proper function is to observe rather than to judge. This is because virtue and vice, the subjects of the present moment, are to a large extent beyond the scope of deliberation. Since virtue is always to be praised and vice to be censured, the only decision to be made is whether virtue has been praised in a worthy manner, or vice fittingly condemned. The direct outcome of the speech, then, is not an immediate resolve to some practical action, but rather a deeply fixed love of virtue or hatred of vice, which may have practical consequences only at some indefinite future time.

Virtue plays the same role in Oratory of Praise as happiness and lawfulness do in the other forms. Here virtue is treated under the aspect either of nobility or baseness, in order to secure the praise or censure by the listener of an individual. There is a ceremonial aspect to this kind of Rhetoric. At political banquets, it may be the virtue of patriotism that is praised; at educational meetings, it may be wisdom. In preaching, the fit topics of praise are the Divine Attributes, the Sacraments, and the virtues of the saints; the targets of censure are the devil, sin, and the mammon of mediocrity.

In Oratory of Praise, the speech itself is the most important mode of persuasion. Of the three kinds of Rhetoric, praise comes closest to the

[8] Mt. 12:42.

poetic mode of argument, for here the audience observes more than it actually judges. For these reasons, style is of great importance. The introduction, for example, should present a tribute of praise in such striking terms that the audience will feel it is hearing something new. Narration will be used only intermittently, and arguments will be of secondary importance. The audience, as we have seen, does not need to be convinced of the laudability of virtue by logical proof; it must rather be edified by the means that magnify or extol the subject most perfectly. Such an argument is amplification, gathering together many aspects of a subject, dwelling upon them vividly. Far from giving the bare essence of its theme, amplification aims at variety and richness, using fresh starts, pauses, and elevated expressions, one following the other in unbroken and ascending order.

The public praise given John the Baptist by Christ is such an argument. It begins by telling what John is *not*, through a series of rhetorical questions: "A reed shaken in the wind? . . . a man clad in silk?" Then in three steps Christ praises him positively: "a prophet; more than a prophet, an angel to be sent before His face," and finally: "There is no greater than John the Baptist among all the sons of women." The reversal that follows is typical of Our Lord's mode of teaching, for it turns the attention of the crowd to a higher order, without detracting from the praise given the prophet: "And yet to be least in the kingdom of heaven is to be greater than he."[9] The implicit conclusion, which speaks so eloquently of the transcendent glories of the Kingdom, marks this argument of Christ's as a true rhetorical enthymeme of great force and beauty.

These remarks on the Oratory of Praise and Censure close our treatment of the specific categories of Rhetoric. The effective use of each type depends largely upon how closely the speaker adheres to the single purpose of one particular class. The speaker who is making an appeal for action should not confuse the question by debating on the justice of that action. His intention must be simply to persuade the audience that a certain kind of action should be taken. In the same way, a defender should not turn to discussing the honorable character of the defendant. He should adhere strictly to the notion of justice, which alone has importance with regard to what is right and lawful. Finally, the orator who praises a deed only weakens his argument if, instead of describing the deed as noble and honorable, he introduces the question of whether it should have been done or not.

He who puts forth the minimal effort necessary to master the art of Rhetoric as presented by Aristotle will find himself in possession of an instrument of limitless worth, not only in its service in the hierarchy of liberal arts, but also in any science suited to its methods. Rhetoric is a habit which treats of matters on a level at which all men can participate.

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[9] Luke 7:24-29.

It convinces them precisely in the way that the majority of men are convinced—through the reinforcement of slender probabilities by the guided and reasonable use of the emotions. In an age when "odium theologiae" is widespread, and the critical spirit permeates even the most Catholic circles, the true and just and good need those defenders who can present solid doctrine in a convincing way. Rhetoric, the persuasion of rational speech, is the perfect instrument of those who speak in the name of Truth.

Anthony Schillaci, O.P.

CHRONICLE

In Rome on Easter Monday of this year The Very Rev. Michael Browne, O.P. was elected Master General of the Order of Friars Preachers. Father Browne was formerly Master of the Sacred Palace, the Pope's "personal theologian," and occupied many important positions in the Roman Curia. REALITY will take great pleasure in dedicating the next issue to the eightieth successor of Saint Dominic.

The winners of the third annual Walter Farrell Memorial writing contest were announced at the close of the first semester's studies in the River Forest Studium. "Kiss of Judas" by Brother Roger Alcorn, O.P. took first place; "What's the Story?" by Brother Anthony Schillaci, O.P. was awarded second place, and "The Presage" by Brother Brian O'Riley, O.P. won third place from the many short stories submitted.

A special celebration in honor of Saint Vincent Ferrer was held at the House of Studies in River Forest. The eve of the feast, April 17, 1955, witnessed the inauguration of an oratorical contest in which six of the student Brothers participated. The Rev. R. J. Nogar, O.P., who conceived and promoted the idea, the Rev. J. H. Hoppe, O.P., and the Rev. T. C. Donlan, O.P., acted as judges. Two Brothers from each of the three classes of philosophers, selected for the excellence of their compositions, were chosen to speak. Brother Anthony Schillaci, O.P., was awarded first place, Brother Eugene Monckton, O.P., second, Brother Louis Carter, O.P., third, Brother Benjamin Russell, O.P., fourth, Brother Casimir Krisinski, O.P., fifth, and Brother Henry Heydenburg, O.P., sixth. Father Donlan also delivered the sermon at the Solemn High Mass on the feast day. Father Hoppe, head of the Western Mission Band, preached each day of the triduum preceding the feast.

The Very Rev. Patrick J. M. Clancy, O.P., S.T.M., was elected Prior of the House of Studies, River Forest, on May 11, 1955. He was officially installed as Prior on May 13, 1955. The Very Rev. Humbert Kane, O.P., S.T.M., was appointed subprior of the House of Studies on May 24, 1955.

On Ascension Thursday, May 19, 1955, the members of the *Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural Science* met with the St. Francis Xavier College faculty, in order to discuss the "Institute in Curriculum and Teach-

er Development" to be held during the summer session at St. Xavier's, June 22–August 3. The Institute was devoted to workshops in the four major areas of the curriculum: Theology and Philosophy; the Social Sciences; the Liberal and Fine Arts; the Natural Sciences.

At the St. Thomas Day celebration held at St. Rose Priory, Dubuque, Iowa, on March 7th, 1955, Mr. Edward P. Pfeffer presented a paper explaining the construction of the article in the *Summa Theologiae* entitled *Thomas the Wonderworker.* Following this there was a scholastic circle at which Bro. Emmanuel Holzer, O.P. defended the thesis: *Amicitia necessaria est ad salutem.* Bro. Hyacinth Maguy objected.

Professor Charles De Koninck delivered a lecture to the faculty and students of St. Rose's Priory on March 25th. The subject of his address was, *The Teaching Authority of St. Thomas.*

The Priory Press inaugurated its activities with the publication of *The Indwelling of The Trinity* by The Rev. F. L. B. Cunningham, O.P. in April 1955. A non-profit, apostolic enterprise, the Priory Press has as its aim to make available important contributions to Catholic thought. Currently published by the Priory Press are Vols. I, II and III of *A Primer of Theology.*

The Very Rev. John A. Driscoll, O.P., S.T.M. and The Very Rev. James R. Gillis, O.P., S.T.M. represented the Faculty of St. Rose's Priory at the National Catholic Educational Association convention which took place in Atlantic City April 12th to 14th.

Representing the Faculty of the House of Studies in River Forest at this convention and at the annual national meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association were the Very Reverend Humbert Kane and Sebastian Carlson, O.P., and the Reverend Fathers Dominic Brady, John Dominic Corcoran, and Benedict Ashley, O.P.

On May 19th, Ascension Thursday, His Excellency the Most Rev. Loras T. Lane, D.D., Auxiliary Bishop of Dubuque, ordained to the priesthood at St. Rose's Priory, The Rev. Dennis Zusy, O.P., The Rev. John Baptist Schneider, O.P., The Rev. Andrew Miehls, O.P., The Rev. Anthony Leahy, O.P., The Rev. Thomas Aquinas Morrison, O.P., The Rev. David Staszak, O.P., The Rev. Timothy Sullivan, O.P., The Rev. Clement Collins, O.P., The Rev. Edmund Bidwill, O.P., and The Rev. Luke Sablica, O.P. Eight other students, continuing their studies at St. Albert's Priory, Oakland, California, received Holy Orders on June 10th. Those ordained were: The Rev. Peter Martyr West, O.P., The Rev. Barnabas Berigan, O.P., The Rev. Urban Goss, O.P., The Rev. Boniface Schmitt, O.P., The Rev. Richard Farmer, O.P., The Rev. Gregory Moore, O.P., The Rev. Malachy Cumiskey, O.P., and The Rev. Henry Holman, O.P. Also ordained earlier this year were three students of St. Albert's province studying at the Angelicum in Rome: The Rev. Benedict Endres, O.P., The Rev. Cajetan Chereso, O.P., and The Rev. Antoninus Ingling, O.P.

REALITY wishes to extend its most cordial congratulations to its former staff members The Rev. Andrew Miehls, O.P., and The Rev. Clement Collins, O.P. for their generous service in behalf of the welfare of this magazine. May they have many fruitful years in Our Lord's ministry.

Some sixty Fathers of St. Albert's Province met in Dubuque for the seventh Annual Provincial Meeting on May 29th and 30th. Papers presented at the sessions in St. Rose's Auditorium were as follows: *St. Dominic and the Dominicans,* by the Rev. J. F. McDonnell, O.P.; *St. Thomas and Theology,* by The Rev. R. R. Masterson, O.P.; *St. Albert and Philosophy,* by The Rev. R. A. Powell, O.P. (read by the Rev. B. W. Ashley, O.P.); *St. Raymond and Canon Law,* by The Very Rev. P. M. J. Clancy, O.P., S.T.M.; *St. Vincent Ferrer and Preaching,* by The Rev. J. B. McMullen, O.P. (read by The Rev. T. C. Donlan, O.P.); *Blessed Jordan and Blessed Humbert and the Liturgy,* by the Rev. T. L. Sanner, O.P.; *Blessed Martin and the Lay-brothers,* by The Rev. G. J. O'Connell, O.P.; *St. Catherine of Siena and the Nuns,* by The Rev. B. A. Neiser, O.P.

His Excellency The Most Rev. Celestine Daly, O.P., S.T.M., Bishop of Des Moines, laid the cornerstone to the new St. Rose Priory on May 31st. His Excellency The Most Rev. Leo Binz, D.D., Archbishop of Dubuque, offered the solemn pontifical Mass which followed the cornerstone ceremony. The solemn benediction after the Mass was celebrated by His Excellency The Most Rev. Joseph Mueller, D.D., Bishop of Sioux City. Present at the ceremonies were His Excellency The Most Rev. Henry P. Rohlman, D.D., Rt. Archbishop of Dubuque, The Very Rev. Dom Philip O'Connor, O.C.S.O., Abbot of New Melleray, and The Very Rev. Edward L. Hughes, O.P., S.T.M., Provincial of The Province of St. Albert the Great. Over a hundred members of the diocesan clergy and sixty Dominican fathers were welcomed as guests by The Very Rev. John A. Driscoll, O.P., S.T.M., Prior of St. Rose.

As the newly appointed socius to the Master General for North America, The Very Rev. John A. Driscoll, O.P., S.T.M. left Dubuque for Rome to take up his new duties there on June 1st. Elected to succeed him as the new Prior of St. Rose is The Very Rev. Anthony Norton, O.P., until recently a member of the theological faculty here.

The Catholic Theological Convention held in New York June 27 to 29 was attended by the Very Rev. Sebastian Carlson, the Rev. Thomas C. Donlan, and the Rev. Jordan Aumann. Fr. Donlan was elected Vice-President of the Catholic Theological Society of America and Fr. Aumann was appointed Chairman of the Committee on Admissions.

The Institute of Spiritual Theology held its fourth summer session from July 6 to August 3. The courses were conducted at the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Illinois, under the direction of the Very Rev. James R. Gillis, O.P., S.T.M. Sixty priests and brothers from sixteen states and Canada were enrolled in the three-year course of studies. The

professorial staff included priests from our three American provinces and from the Belgian province. Professors from St. Joseph's Province were the Very Rev. Philip Mulhern, O.P., S.T.M., and the Very Rev. Ferrer Smith, O.P., S.T.Bacc.; from Holy Name Province, Rev. Paul Starrs, O.P., S.T.Lr. Rev. Augustin Léonard, O.P., S.T.Lr. was guest professor from Belgium. Twelve students who had completed the three-year course in Spiritual Theology were graduated on August 3, 1955. Very Rev. Edward L. Hughes, Provincial of St. Albert the Great Province conferred the certificates to the graduates. The sermon for the graduation exercises was delivered by Very Rev. Gerard Joubert, O.P.

Last summer the Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural Science engaged in summer school work at Saint Francis Xavier College in Chicago and at The Institutum Divi Thomae in Cincinnati.

At Xavier College a continuing effort is being made to develop an integrated program of liberal education for Catholic students through the elementary, high school and college levels, and to help teachers to understand and to present their particular subject matters in view of the whole continuum of liberal education. This is an exceptional opportunity to apply the integral doctrine of St. Thomas to the urgent problems which modern educators must face. Many of these problems were discussed in four distinct seminars which were attended by more than a hundred Sisters teaching at the various levels and representing a dozen religious communities. Fathers B. M. Ashley, O.P., R. J. Nogar, O.P., and J. T. Bonée, O.P., conducted the seminar in the liberal and the fine arts; Fathers R. J. Nogar, O.P., A. Wallace, O.P. (of St. Joseph's Province), and J. D. Corcoran, O.P., in the natural sciences; Fathers B. M. Ashley, O. P., and R. A. Powell, O.P., in the social sciences; Fathers W. H. Kane, O. P., R. R. Masterson, O.P., M. J. Faraon, O.P., and J. T. Bonée, O.P., in philosophy and theology.

The seminar at The Institutum Divi Thomae, set up by the late Archbishop McNicholas, O.P. for the purpose of integrating Thomistic philosophy and modern science, was attended by thirty-five scientists and science teachers. Father J. T. Bonée, O.P., discussed the historical and logical aspects of the problem; Father W. H. Kane, O.P., explained the fundamental concepts and principles of natural science, and Father A. Wallace, O.P. the organization of specialized physics and chemistry. The work will continue next summer, with emphasis on the biological sciences.

On July 2, Very Rev. Timothy M. Sparks, O.P., S.T.M., celebrated his silver jubilee of ordination to the priesthood. He offered a solemn Mass of Thanksgiving at the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Illinois. Very Rev. Edward L. Hughes, O.P., Provincial, delivered the congratulatory sermon. Assistants to Father Sparks were Very Rev. Patrick M. Clancy, O.P. and Very Rev. Humbert W. Kane, O.P.

REALITY would like to extend its most sincere congratulations to Father Sparks on this occasion as a token of its deep appreciation of his work in behalf of this magazine. His enthusiastic encouragement and wholehearted support of our efforts have made difficult tasks easier and productive of better results. He has given us a shining example of devotion to duty and of a sincere interest in the works of the province. May God bless him for this now and in the years to come.

REALITY'S Chronicle takes this opportunity to call attention to the new plan for training in preaching approved by the academic council. Four phases of development are envisaged by the program, which, in addition to the seven years of the studentate, takes in the preparatory years at Smyth Hall and the Novitiate.

1. *The Preparatory Phase* at Smyth Hall and the Novitiate has as its aim the development and perfecting of the liberal arts as a background to future work in preaching. Besides the attention devoted to the basic arts of grammar, composition, spelling and pronunciation, an effort will be made to develop correct techniques in the use of the voice. During the year at the Novitiate, special care will also be given to familiarizing future preachers with the apostolic traditions of the Order as it is exemplified in the lives of our saints and blesseds.

2. *The Analytic Phase* of the course will be the preoccupation of the Studium of philosophy. It is called analytic because during these three years the primary concern will be to learn the elements of the human art and mechanics of discourse. At this time the accent will fall upon the spectator rather than the participant aspect of the art. Students will read aloud, memorize, and practice mechanics with a view to mastering the formal side of the art of oratory.

3. *The Synthetic Phase* will be the work of the studium of Theology. With the instrument of discourse, the rhetorical art, well in hand, students will be given opportunity to write and deliver sermons corresponding to the parts of theology studied. The synthesis of the form and content of oratory will take place during these years.

4. *The Graduate Phase,* in the year following ordination will be devoted to an intensive practice-preaching program. Besides the application of the various kinds of oratory to contemporary apostolic problems, special attention will be given to the use of oratory in Missions, Retreats, Days of Recollection, Forty-Hours, etc.

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